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1Abstract
Corporate disclosure consists of mandatory periodic disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Both
contribute to the reduction of information asymmetries arising between the company and the
current and/or potential investors, and between the company and other users. The compulsory
information is prescribed by current applicable regulations and accounting standards, and refers to
periodic financial reports. Further, companies have at their disposal several channels to
communicate additional information to the public on a voluntary basis (e.g. conference calls, road
shows and press releases). Concerning mandatory disclosure, the balance sheet is one of the
fundamental financial statements for all companies, including firms undertaking Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs). IPO prospectuses are the first means for firms willing to quote on capital markets
to disclose financial information to the public. Several determinants may influence the level of
disclosure, measured in terms of disclosed balance sheet items, in IPO prospectuses. Moreover, the
extent of disclosure may affect investors’ ability to value the IPO. Based on a sample of 683 IPOs
completed between 2003 and 2012, the results suggest that post-crisis firms and companies with a
greater time distance between S-1 and 424 filings present a greater level of detailed information
concerning their liabilities. In addition, firms operating in the ‘Oil, Gas and Coal’ industry present
a greater disclosure level compared to the other industry types. Further analyses indicate that first-
day returns are negatively affected by noncurrent assets and positively influenced by noncurrent
liabilities.
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31. Introduction
Listed companies communicate information to the public through reporting and disclosure.
The financial reporting is becoming more complex due to the increasing number of regulatory
requirements, which contributes to the growth in size of annual reports. On the other hand, the
growing information needs of financial users have increased the disclosure channels. However,
“improving disclosures is not only a matter of quantity but also of quality of information” (ESMA,
2015). Consistently, recent regulatory interventions, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of
2002 in US and the Transparency Directive Amending Directive (TDAD) of 2013 in EU, aim to
ensure the reliability and the transparency of publicly reported financial information.
Corporate disclosure has a critical role in the capital market operations (Healy and Palepu,
2001). Indeed, disclosure reduces “the possibility of information asymmetries” arising between the
firm and the current and/or potential investors, and other financial report users (Leuz and
Verrecchia, 2000). Consistently, Bhattacharya et al. (2003a) find that greater levels of earnings
opacity (i.e. lack of information) cause higher cost of equity and lower volume of trading in the
stock market of that country. Conversely, an increase in the quality of mandated disclosures reduces
the cost of capital, even if unevenly, in the economy (Lambert et al., 2007). Hence, one instrument
to communicate with the public is represented by the mandatory disclosure that consists of periodic
financial statements and other accounting reports. However, companies have at their disposal also
the voluntary disclosure. Firms disclose additional information using different channels, e.g.
conference calls, road shows and press releases.
Among the compulsory financial statements, the balance sheet is a critical statement to assess
the company’s financial health, also through the financial ratios. Indeed, the balance sheet, also
known as “statement of financial position”, presents a detailed list of company assets, liabilities
and shareholders’ equity at a certain point in time. Reading the balance sheet investors gain
awareness of what the company owns and owes, and the amount invested by shareholders.
Regulations and accounting standards define the balance sheet minimum content for an effective
communication. Fairfield et al. (1996) and Hermann et al. (2000) find that a greater level of
earnings disaggregation improve the accuracy of analysts forecasts. Similarly, Chen et al. (2015)
construct a measure of disclosure quality and find that increasing the balance sheet disaggregation
improves both analysts forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy.
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) represent an interesting case for the analysis of the balance
sheet content. Indeed, “effective communication with the investment community is critical to
4getting the right valuation at the time of the IPO” (PwC, 2014). IPO prospectuses (e.g. Form S-1
and Form 424) are the first means to disclose financial information to the public. The SEC Form
S-1 is the preliminary prospectus for a US company IPO, while the final IPO prospectus must be
filed within two business days after pricing. These prospectuses contain disclosures about the
company’s business, results of operations, financial condition, management and other issues.
Given the critical role of IPO prospectuses, this study investigates whether the level of
disclosure, defined as balance sheet disaggregation, is affected by some variables and is related to
the capital market. The first set of hypotheses assesses whether there are determinants for additional
disclosures in the balance sheet. First, it is examined whether the balance sheet disaggregation may
exhibit year-to-year changes in the sample period. Second, it is assessed whether a greater time
distance between S-1 and 424 filings may imply a higher number of additional disclosures in the
final IPO prospectuses. Third, it is investigated whether higher levels of regulations lead to greater
balance sheet information content. The second hypothesis explores whether the extent of balance
sheet disclosure has an impact on first-day returns.
 The analysis is based on Brown et al. (2017) sample of US IPOs completed between 2003
and 2012. Following some selection criteria, the final sample is of 683 IPOs. The balance sheet or
consolidated balance sheet in each final IPO prospectus is classified following a template balance
sheet structure. The scheme is grounded on Regulation S-X requirements for the balance sheet
presentation. The line items required by the regulation are considered “generic” line items, because
they represent the balance sheet minimum information content. The additional disclosures instead
are treated as “specific” line items. The classified balance sheets are the basis for the calculation
of measures that summarise the financial statement content. In addition, three types of measures
are calculated to capture additional disclosures and to assess their pervasiveness in the balance
sheet (i.e. SPLI, SPLIFC and SPLITC). SPLI measures the number of balance sheet categories with
specific line items. The other two indicator variables are ratios of the number of balance sheet
categories with specific line items over the filled categories (SPLIFC) and over total categories
(SPLITC), respectively.
Several empirical analyses are performed to test the hypotheses. The descriptive analysis of
the balance sheet disaggregation is performed in relation to three different variables: listing year,
days between S-1 and 424 filings (DAYS), and industry classification. The listing year is used to
analyse the temporal change, and to compare pre-crisis IPOs (2003-2007) to post-crisis IPOs
(2008-2012). Using the days between S-1 and 424 filings, IPOs taking less 111 days (Median) to
5list are compared to those having a greater time distance between S-1 and 424 filings. Additionally,
Fama-French 10 industry classification scheme is used to assess whether the extent of balance sheet
disclosure varies according to the industry type. Finally, the regression analyses aim to determine
whether the levels of disclosure in the balance sheets of final IPOs prospectuses affects first-day
returns. The regression models concentrate on assets and liabilities variables, generic and specific
variables, and the indicator variables.
The descriptive evidence shows that the level of balance sheet disclosure undergoes increases
or decreases in correspondence of years 2008 and 2009 suggesting that the financial crisis had an
impact on the number of line items disclosed. When comparing pre-crisis IPOs to post-crisis IPOs,
it emerges that even if the total number of balance sheet items is almost unchanged in the two
subsamples, in the post-crisis period firms disclose more detailed information in their liabilities’
sections. Concerning the days between S-1 and 424 filings, the findings suggest that firms taking
more time to list present a greater level of detailed information concerning their current liabilities.
Finally, in the analysis based on the industry classification, the ‘Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and
Products’ industry stands out. Indeed, it mostly displays the greatest values in both balance sheet
variables and indicator variables.
The results across the regression models involving the balance sheet variables indicate that
only the asset side negatively affects the first-day returns with Noncurrent Assets. The greater the
number of line items in this subsection, the lower are the first-day returns. Concerning the
regression models involving the indicator variables, empirical evidence suggests that they do not
have a strong predictive power. Only two indicator variables related to liabilities affect first-day
returns in a positive way.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the main regulatory developments
and the main financial research findings regarding corporate disclosure divided into mandatory
disclosure (2.1) and voluntary disclosure (2.2). Section 3 deals with the balance sheet analysis.
First, it discusses the hypothesis development (3.1). Second, it describes the sample, the data
collection for the analysis and the variables (3.2). Third, it provides the descriptive evidence of
data collected (3.3). Finally, it offers the analysis of the sample using multivariate models (3.4).
Section 4 provides the conclusions.
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72. Corporate disclosure
 “Corporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market” (Healy and
Palepu, 2001). The purpose of corporate disclosure in the capital markets is “to mitigate the
‘information problem’ and the ‘agency problem’”. The information or ‘lemons’ problem refers to
information differences and conflicting incentives between entrepreneurs and savers. The agency
problem refers to the conflict of interest between company’s management and company’s
shareholders. Managers should maximize shareholders’ wealth, but they have an incentive to
maximize their own wealth.
Firms’ financial reporting and disclosure are very wide and include the following:
- The external financial statements (balance sheet, income statement, statement of cash flows,
and statement of  stockholders’ equity);
- The notes to the financial statements;
- Press releases and conference calls;
- Quarterly and annual reports;
- Financial information posted on a corporation’s website;
- Financial reports to governmental agencies;
- Prospectuses pertaining to the issuance of common stock and other securities.
Corporate disclosure consists of mandatory disclosure and voluntary communication. Firms
disclose the compulsory information in annual reports and other financial reports and provide
voluntary information through different channels, such as analysts’ presentations and conference
calls, press releases, announcements on internet sites, management forecasts and other corporate
reports.
 The aim of mandatory disclosure is “to satisfy the users’ informational needs, ensuring the
production quality control through the laws and standards’ observance” (Adina and Ion, 2008). The
applicable regulations for listed companies are promulgated by US Congress and Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC) in US and by the Council of the European Union and the European
Parliament in the European Union (EU).1 In particular, in US the Securities Act of 1933 and the
1 US Congress is the legislative body. It consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Instead, SEC is an
independent, federal government agency. Its mission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.
The European Council consists of the leader (prime minister or president) of each EU member plus the President of
the European Commission plus the president of the Council. It provides broad guidelines for EU policy. The European
Parliament shares legislative powers with the European Council and the European Commission.
8Securities Exchange Act of 1934 represent the first-time imposition of disclosure requirements. In
recent years, SEC promulgates two major reforms of securities regulation related to disclosure:
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. In the
European Union, the Fourth (1978)2 and Seventh (1983)3 directives represent the first
developments towards the harmonization of company law across Member States. Another
important step is the ‘IAS Regulation’ of 2002, which establishes a single set of accounting
standards for the preparation of listed companies’ consolidated financial statements.
 The accounting standards are also critical for mandatory disclosure. Indeed, they support
firms in preparing and presenting their performance to the public. US has adopted adopts the US
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) since 1933. These standards are
promulgated by Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), which is an independent board
with the role of establishing and communicating standards of financial accounting and reporting
since 1973. Outside US, 150 countries currently use International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). 4 On 19 July 2002, the European Union Parliament passed a regulation requiring all
companies listed in the EU to adopt IFRS for fiscal years starting after 1 January 2005. The
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), an independent body, is in charge of developing
and approving IFRS since April 2001.5
 In addition to mandatory disclosure, companies voluntarily disclose information to the
public. The term voluntary disclosure, as defined by FASB (2011), describes “disclosures,
primarily outside the financial statements, that are not explicitly required by GAAP or an SEC
rule”.6 The purpose of voluntary disclosure is to enrich information disclosed under regulatory
requirements. Hence, voluntary disclosure represents an alternative communication tool at disposal
of companies.
The contrast between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure reflects the distinction
between “hard” and “soft” information, which is gaining importance in recent financial research.
Arnold et al. (2010) affirm that “hard information is most often numerical, while soft information
2 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts
of certain types of companies
3 Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on consolidated
accounts
4 The use of IFRS standards by jurisdiction is displayed at: http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-
standards-by-jurisdiction/.
5 The IASB was formed in 2001 to replace the International Accounting Standards Committee.
6 However, as recognized by the Steering Committee, the purpose of most part of “voluntary disclosure” is to comply
with the SEC’s requirements concerning description of a business and management’s discussion and analysis of
financial condition and results of operations (MD&A).
9is generally textual and often admits different interpretations from different observers making it
ambiguous”. Hard information instead is the information contained in the balance sheet, the income
statement, the overall management section and the cash flow statement. This information represents
company’s fundamentals, e.g. revenues, earnings, assets, liabilities and growth. On the other side,
soft information can offer context to financial numbers and share values, provide insight into
managerial expectations, and identify important qualifiers or caveats that are absent from purely
numerical data (Ferris et al., 2013). Textual information can be considered a completion of
quantitative analysis, i.e. hard information. One way to investigate soft information is through
textual analysis, whose aim is to describe the content and the features of texts.
To improve the quality and readability of soft information in financial reporting and
disclosure, regulators have intervened. In US, the SEC issued Plain English Mandate in 1998. It
requires following plain English principles in writing the front page of filings and that the
prospectuses must be clear, concise, and understandable. In EU IASB launched the Disclosure
Initiative in 2013, whose objective is to improve the effectiveness of disclosures in financial
statements. Currently, this initiative includes six projects and is still on going.
Non-GAAP measures (hereinafter, NGMs) are a kind of middle ground between hard and
soft information, a sort of semi-hard/semi-soft information. NGMs represent one of the main
corporate managers’ voluntary disclosures. However, they are “numerical measures of a
registrant’s historical or future financial performance, financial position, or cash flows that exclude
(include) amounts that are included (excluded) from the most directly comparable measure
calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP” (SEC, 2003). Firms began reporting NGMs
in the late 1990s to supplement the GAAP financial information. In response to their alleged
misuse, SEC released Regulation G (hereinafter referred to as “Reg G”) in January 2003. Similarly,
IASB regulates NGMs disclosure through ‘Disclosure Initiative – Amendments to IAS 1’.
This section briefly presents the regulations governing corporate mandatory and voluntary
disclosure and reviews the related financial research. Section 2.1 is dedicated to mandatory
disclosure. It presents a brief summary of the evolution of reporting and disclosure regulations,
describes the accounting standards, and examines the impact of mandatory disclosure on the
market. Section 2.2 focuses on voluntary disclosure. It describes what soft information and non-
GAAP measures are, and presents the results of financial research concerning textual analysis and
the disclosure of NGMs.
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2.1 Mandatory Disclosure
Mandatory disclosure requirements for listed companies consist of current applicable
regulations and accounting standards. The applicable regulations are presented through their main
developments in US and EU regulatory environment. The accounting standards complete the
mandatory disclosure requirements. The focus is on IFRS and US GAAP, which are the most
important accounting standards around the world. The objective of mandatory disclosure is to
increase the information content and to ensure a certain level of quality for the data communicated
by listed companies. Financial researchers investigate the effects of mandatory disclosure on the
capital markets providing insights on their benefits.
This section proceeds as follows. Section 2.1.1 contains the main developments of the
applicable regulations in both the United States and the European Union. Section 2.1.2 presents
IFRS and US GAAP, the convergence project and their main differences. Section 2.1.3 focuses on
the association between mandatory disclosure and the market.
2.1.1 Corporate disclosure regulations in the United States and in the European Union
The US corporate disclosure regulations
SEC sets the disclosure rules for US listed companies. Table 1, panel A summarizes the main
developments regarding disclosure and financial reporting rules in the United States. The first
regulations providing disclosure requirements are the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. In recent years, SEC promulgates two major reforms related to disclosure:
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Other
important developments concerning US corporate disclosure are Regulation S-X, Regulation S-K
and Regulation G.
US Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
restore public and investor confidence in the fairness of the securities markets after the Stock
Market Crash of 1929; and created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with authority
to prescribe “the methods to be followed in the preparation of [financial] reports” (Zeff, 2005).
Often referred to as the “truth in securities” law, the Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives:
- “[Requiring] that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning
securities being offered for public sale; and
- [Prohibiting] deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities”.
11
Companies issuing securities must register with SEC. This ensures that they provide SEC and
potential investors with all relevant information through prospectus and registration statement.
With the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, US Congress created the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is the first financial regulator in history. SEC covers all aspects of the securities
industry, including the power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms, transfer agents,
and clearing agencies as well as the nation’s securities self-regulatory organizations (SROs).7
Furthermore, the SEC has the power to require periodic reporting of information by companies
with publicly traded securities. There are mandatory filings for periodic reports (10-K, 10-Q),
significant events (8-K), and in case of first release of securities (Form S-1, Form 424 and the
related variants). These reports are available to the public through the SEC’s EDGAR database.8
The first US accounting regulations introduced Regulation S-X (Reg S-X)9, which set the
rules regarding the detailed form and content requirements applicable to financial statements
included in registration statements, periodic reports and other filings compulsory under the
Securities Act (1933) and the Exchange Act (1934). Rules 3-01 to 3-20 specify the disclosure
documents to be prepared in accordance with Regulation S-X, i.e. balance sheet, income statement,
comprehensive income, changes in shareholder’s equity and cash flow statement. In October 2016,
the SEC adopted some amendments to Regulation S-X as part of its Investment Company
Reporting Modernization efforts. For example, it amends certain rules regarding the general form
and content of financial statements. These amendments involve “Total investments”, income from
payment-in-kind interest or non-cash dividends, Statement of Operations, written option activity
disclosure.10
Regulation S-X contains a reference to the accounting standards. “Rule 4-01 requires that
financial statement must be prepared according to US GAAP or ‘translated’ to US GAAP, with
few exceptions”. However, since the end of 1990s, companies disclose also non-GAAP measures
7 The New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ Stock Market, and the Chicago Board of Options are SROs.
8 EDGAR is the SEC tool through which all companies, foreign and domestic, are required to file registration
statements, periodic reports, and other forms electronically.
9 17 C.F.R. Part 210 – “Form and Content of and Requirements for Financial Statements, Securities Act of 1933,
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Investment Company Act of 1940,
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975”.
10 The amendments affect the mentioned items as follows:
- “Total investments” can be presented in either assets or liabilities.
- Companies must separately disclose income from payment-in-kind interest or non-cash dividends only if it is
greater than 5% of the fund’s investment income.
- The amendments require the Statement of Operations presentation of net realized and unrealized gain or loss
during the period to conform with those changes to the presentation in the schedule of investments.
- The current written option activity disclosure has been eliminated.
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with the aim of providing better insights into their business. Regulation G (2003) 11 and Item 10e
of Regulation S-K rule the disclosure of NGMs. Reg G contains a general disclosure requirement
and a specific requirement of a reconciliation of the non-GAAP financial measure to the most
directly comparable GAAP financial measure. In addition, the SEC provides the Division’s
interpretations of the rules and regulations on the use of non-GAAP financial measures in
Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations section (“C&DIs”). “The [2016] updated guidance
provides clarifying examples in areas of frequent staff comment, including misleading non-GAAP
presentations and non-GAAP measures with greater prominence than the comparable GAAP
measures” (PwC, 2016b).
Regulation S-X is also related to Regulation S-K (Reg S-K)12, which was introduced by the
Securities Act of 1933. Reg S-K sets out reporting requirements for various SEC filings and
registrations used by public companies. Financial data to be included are net sales or operating
revenues, income (loss) from continuing operations, income (loss) from continuing operations per
common share, total assets, long-term obligations and redeemable preferred stock, and cash
dividends declared per common share. In addition, firms must include additional items that would
help with the understanding of the financial condition and results of operations.
Before Regulation Fair Disclosure (2000), many companies released important information
in meetings and conference calls without sharing them also with other shareholders and the public.
In order to prevent selective disclosures the SEC proposed a regulation to address this issue in
December 1999. This proposal encountered the opposition of large institutional investor and the
favour of thousands of individual investors. Reg FD was enacted on 23 October 2000. It aims to
promote the full and fair disclosure. Indeed, it provides that: “Whenever an issuer, or any person
acting on its behalf, discloses any material non-public information regarding that issuer or its
securities to [certain enumerated persons], the issuer shall make public disclosure of that
information [...] simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and [...] promptly, in the
case of a non-intentional disclosure.”
The second major reform in recent years is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. US
Congress enacted SOX on July 30, in light of the Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia
and Tyco corporate scandals. Besides the financial scandals, other situations required changes to
11 Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the Commission to adopt rules requiring that any public disclosure
or release of non-GAAP financial measures by a company filing reports under Section 13(a)14 or 15(d)15 of the
Exchange Act.
12 Part 229—“Standard instructions for filing forms under securities act of 1933, securities exchange act of 1934 and
energy policy and conservation act of 1975—Regulation S-K”
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the regulation of financial practice and corporate governance. For example, auditing firms provided
both audit and non-audit services to the same companies; the bank lend money to large firms
ignoring the risks of the company. SOX contains eleven titles. Title IV Enhanced Financial
Disclosures includes three of the most important sections of SOX: Section 401, 404 and 409.
Section 401 prescribes that financial statements published by issuers are required to be accurate
and presented in a manner that does not contain incorrect statements or admit to state material
information. Section 404 requires issuers to publish information in their annual reports concerning
the scope and adequacy of the internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. This
statement shall also assess the effectiveness of such internal controls and procedures. Section 409
provides that issuers are required to disclose to the public, on an urgent basis, information on
material changes in their financial condition or operations.
The corporate disclosure regulations in the European Union
In the European Union, companies’ law directives and regulations establish the accounting
rules.13 The aim is the harmonization of company law across Member States. Table 1, panel B
summarizes the main developments regarding disclosure and financial reporting rules in the
European Union. The first two major directives having an impact on accounting are the Fourth
(1978) and Seventh (1983). Indeed, they are known as “Accounting Directives”. The Fourth
Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 aims to respond to the need to coordinate national
regulations relating to the structure, content and publication of annual accounts of public limited
liability companies, incorporated partnerships and limited liability companies. The annual accounts
consists of a balance sheet, a profit and loss account and the notes to the accounts. The stated
general principles for the valuation of items in the annual accounts are among the others prudence
and consistency in the application of the methods of valuation.14 The Fourth Directive lists the
information, which must be provided in the notes to the accounts.15 The annual report must include
a fair review of the development of the company’s business and of its position. It must also provide
information on any important events that have occurred since the end of the financial year, the
13 The EU Directives are applicable to all Member States and set certain aims, requirements and concrete results that
must be achieved in every Member State. National authorities must create or adapt their legislation to meet these aims
by the date specified in each given Directive. Regulations instead have direct application and enforceability in all
Member States and do not have to be enacted in national legislation to take effect.
14 See Article 31, Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978.
15 The information that must be provided in the notes to the accounts are the valuation methods applied to the various
items, undertakings in which the company holds a certain percentage of the capital, certain types of the company's
debts, financial commitments not included in the balance sheet, etc.
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company’s likely future development and activities in the field of research and development.
Lastly, the Directive provide for a system of auditing under which companies must have their
annual accounts audited by one or more persons authorised by national law to audit accounts. Such
a person or persons must also verify that the annual report is consistent with the annual accounts
for the same financial year.
The Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 defines the circumstances in
which consolidated accounts must be presented. Any company (parent company) which legally
controls another company (subsidiary company) must prepare consolidated accounts. In most
cases, legal control takes the form of the holding of a majority of voting rights. Member States may
also require consolidated accounts to be prepared in cases where a parent company has only a
minority shareholding but exercises de facto control. Member States may also exempt some
companies from this obligation according to the figures contained in the Seventh Directive. These
figures are thresholds for defining the groups, which can be exempted completely from the
consolidated accounts requirement.16 The consolidate accounts must include a fair review of the
development of the company’s business and of its position and are subject to auditing by one or
more authorized persons as well.
In 1995, the European Commission decided to adhere to the International Accounting
Standard Board (IASB) standards to strengthen European accounting requirements, instead of
further developing specific European accounting rules. Five years later (June 2000), the European
Commission proposed to introduce the IFRS for the presentation of consolidated financial
statements of all European listed companies. This proposal became regulation in 2002. Regulation
(EC) No 1606/200217, also known as IAS Regulation, requires all listed companies to prepare their
consolidated financial statements in accordance with a single set of international standards, i.e.
IFRS.18 The standards’ purpose is to enhance the transparency and comparability of company
accounts. This in turn increases market efficiency and reduces the cost of raising capital for
companies improving competitiveness and boosting growth in the EU.
16 Fourth Directive (1978) defines “Small” companies as companies which, on their balance sheet dates, do not exceed
the limits of two of the following three criteria:
- Balance sheet total: EUR 4 400 000;
- Net turnover: EUR 8 800 000;
- Number of employees: 50.
17 Regulation (EC) no 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of
International Accounting Standards.
18 The first standards issued by IASB were International Accounting Standards (IAS). Those were renamed to IFRS
in 2001.
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The process regarding IFRS adoption was completed by Regulation (EC) No 1126/200819,
which codifies IFRS as adopted by the EU. The process for the introduction of a new accounting
standard requires first the endorsement at EU level. Subsequently, the European Commission
publishes an amending regulation, which is directly applicable in all EU countries. Regulation (EC)
No 1126/2008 has been amended several times to include all the standards presented by the IASB
since 2008, including the amendments from 2012 on consolidated financial statements,
partnerships and information to be provided on interests held in other entities. Meanwhile, Fair
Value Directive 2001/03/EC20 and Modernization Directive 2003/51/EC21 amended the Fourth and
Seventh Directives to eliminate incompatibilities between European accounting rules and IFRS.
Another important development in the European financial reporting regulation is the
Transparency Directive (TD) or Directive 2004/109/EC22 issued in 2004 and amended by the
Transparency Directive Amending Directive (TDAD) or Directive 2013/50/EU23 in 2013. TD aims
to ensure information transparency for investors through a regular flow of disclosure of periodic
and on-going regulated information and the dissemination of such information to the public.
Regulated information consists of financial reports, information on major holdings of voting rights
and other disclosures based on Market Abuse Directive (2003/6/EC)24. As reported by PwC (2017),
periodic reporting requirements are the following:
19 Commission regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 of 3 November 2008 adopting certain international accounting standards
in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council.
20 The Fair Value Directive applies to financial statements subject to the Fourth and Seventh Directives and the Bank
Accounts Directive. It requires Member States to either permit or require the use of fair value accounting for some
financial assets and financial liabilities in companies’ consolidated financial statements; and gives Member States an
option additionally to either permit or require the use of fair value accounting for some financial assets and financial
liabilities in companies’ legal entity financial statements.
21 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003 amending Directives
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts of certain types of
companies, banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings.
22 Directive 2013/50/EU of the European parliament and of the council of 22 October 2013 amending Directive
2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonization of transparency requirements in
relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive
2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are
offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC.
23 Directive 2013/50/EU the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 amending Directive
2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in
relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Directive
2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are
offered to the public or admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC.
24 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and
market manipulation (market abuse). Market abuse may arise in circumstances where investors have been unreasonably
disadvantaged, directly or indirectly, by others who:
- have used information which is not publicly available (insider dealing);
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- Interim management statements (IMS). Between 10 weeks after the beginning and six
weeks before the end of the relevant six month period.
- Half-yearly reports. Two months from half-year date.
- Annual financial reports. Four months from year-end date.
 The Accounting Directive (AD)25 was published on 26 June 2013, entered into force on 20
July 2013 and is effective in Member States (date of transposition) since 20 July 2015. This
directive replaces the existing Fourth and Seventh Directives on company law, which addressed
reporting by companies generally, and by groups. One of the main changes introduced by this
directive is the maximum harmonization regime for small undertakings. Harmonization implies a
reduction in Member State Options to add any further disclosure requirements that are needed for
a true and fair view or to meet user needs in their national context. Member states have no more
the option to require increasing disclosures for certain financial statement items in respect of small
undertaking. This option instead is available for medium-sized and large companies.
2.1.2 The accounting standards: IFRS and US GAAP
The role of accounting standards, e.g. IFRS and US GAAP, is critical for mandatory
disclosure. They represent a guideline for financial accounting. In other words, they support firms
in preparing and presenting their performance to the public. The Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 introduced US GAAP. US GAAP are promulgated by FASB,
which is an independent board created in 1973. IFRS are other existing accounting standards. They
are issued by IASB since April 2001 and have replaced International Accounting Standards (IAS).
On 19 July 2002, EU Parliament passed a regulation requiring the adoption of IFRS for all
companies listed in the EU for fiscal years starting after 1 January 2005.
Most of the world’s capital markets now require IFRS, or some form thereof, for financial
statements of public-interest entities. The remaining major capital markets not adopting IFRS are
(PwC, 2016a):
- have distorted the price-setting mechanism of financial instruments;
- have disseminated false or misleading information.
This type of conduct can undermine the general principle that all investors must be placed on an equal footing.
25 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive
2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and
83/349/EEC.
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- US, where domestic public companies must use US GAAP, while IFRS Standards are
permitted for both domestic public companies and foreign companies;
- Japan, where domestic public companies are permitted but not required to use IFRS
standards. They are also permitted for listings by foreign companies together with  Japanese
GAAP, Japan’s Modified International Standards (JMIS), and US GAAP;
- India, which has not adopted IFRS Standards for reporting by domestic companies and has
not yet formally committed to adopt IFRS Standards; and
- China, which has committed to adopt IFRS Standards for reporting by at least some
domestic companies at some undefined future date.
The IFRS foundation is monitoring IFRS standards application around the world and
currently the profiles of 150 jurisdictions, including all of the G20 jurisdictions, have been
completed.26 126 jurisdictions (84 per cent of the profiles) require IFRS Standards for all or most
domestic publicly accountable entities —listed companies and financial institutions— in their
capital markets. Expect Bhutan, which will begin using IFRS standards in 2021, all other
jurisdictions have already adopted IFRS Standards. The remaining 24 jurisdictions behave as
follows:
- 12 jurisdictions permit, rather than require, IFRS Standards (Bermuda, Cayman Islands,
Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname,
Switzerland, Timor-Leste);
- One jurisdiction requires IFRS Standards for financial institutions but not listed companies
(Uzbekistan);
- One jurisdiction is in process of adopting IFRS Standards in full (Thailand);
- One jurisdiction is in process of converging its national standards substantially (but not
entirely) with IFRS Standards (Indonesia); and
- Nine jurisdictions use national or regional standards (Bolivia, China, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau,
India, Macao, Niger, United States, Vietnam).27
Figure 1 shows the pervasiveness of IFRS adoption. Following the broad worldwide
acceptance of IFRS, the FASB signed the Norwalk agreement with IASB in 2002 to explore the
26 The IFRS Foundation is a not-for-profit, public interest organisation established to develop a single set of high-
quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted accounting standards —IFRS Standards— and to promote
and facilitate adoption of the standards. It has a three-tier governance structure, which includes International
Accounting Standards Board, IFRS Foundation Trustees and IFRS Foundation Monitoring Board.
27 All the information concerning jurisdictions adopting IFRS are available at: http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-
world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/.
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possibilities of convergence of US GAAP with IFRS standards (Chatterjee et al. 2016). This
commitment was renewed in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between IASB and FASB
originally issued in 2006 and updated in 2008 and 2010 (FASB, 2014). Since 2007, the SEC has
accepted IFRS-based financial statements from foreign issuers without any need to reconcile such
statements with US GAAP (SEC, 2008), and since 2010, multinational companies are allowed by
SEC to report earnings according to IFRS. “The original goal was for all US companies to adopt
IFRS by 2014, but that self-imposed deadline has come and gone” (McQuilkin and Ruggieri, 2015).
There is no commitment to adopt IFRS standards by US yet. But the discussion about the use of
IFRS in the US continues.
There are many advantages related to the convergence of US GAAP with IFRS standards.
First, the comparability of financial statements, which is necessary due to the globalization of
capital markets (McQuilkin and Ruggieri, 2015). Second, the economic benefits of adopting IFRS:
“a reduction in the cost of capital and a potential increase in capital flows” (Chatterjee et al., 2016).
Investors can easier compare investments in foreign securities, access capital in other countries and
acquire stock in the companies (McQuilkin and Ruggieri, 2015). In other words, the adoption of
IFRS by US can contribute to the integration of capital markets and to the development of stock
markets by eliminating the barriers to investments.
“The FASB and the IASB convergence projects have made significant progress in increasing
uniformity between US GAAP and IFRS in areas such as share-based payments, business
combinations, inventory and segment reporting” (Chatterjee et al., 2016) . However, there are still
significant differences between US GAAP and IFRS in different areas (see PwC, 2016a). Some
differences are the conceptual approach, the accounting treatment of certain line items and the
presentation of financial statements.
The main difference concerns the methodology. US GAAP standards are rules-based, while
IFRS standards are principles-based. “The rule-based standards, the dominant approach of FASB,
try to anticipate all or most of the problems and find solutions, while the principle-based standards,
the dominant approach of IASB, are less prescriptive and are based on the objectives and the
principles which need to be followed” (Hlaciuc et al., 2014). IFRS potentially lead to different
interpretations for similar transactions; therefore, it may require extensive disclosures in the
financial statements. On the other hand, the principles may allow the companies to better represent
their business to the public.
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The accounting treatment difference involves inventory, development costs and revenue
recognition. Regarding inventory, the discrepancies are related to the allowed assessment methods,
the calculation of depreciation, the recognition of impairment reversals, the accounting of the
inventories resulting from agricultural activities (Hlaciuc et al., 2014; Chatterjee et al., 2016)28.
Regarding the development costs, FASB ASC (Accounting Standards Codification) 730 requires
their recognition as expenses, while IAS 38 requires that the development costs should be
capitalized. There are conceptual differences that involves also the revenue recognition. US GAAP
guidance focuses on “revenue being (i) either realized or realizable and (ii) earned” (PwC, 2016a).
Conversely, IAS 18 requires that goods should be recognized when certain criteria have been
satisfied. The criteria involved are the transfer of significant risks, the absence of ownership or
control over the goods, the reliability of the sales amount and the related costs.29
Many differences concern the presentation of financial statements (Hlaciuc et al., 2014).
Under IAS 1, a complete set of financial statements includes also comparative information; instead,
US GAAP specify no requirements for comparative information.30 The most significant difference
between income statement and statement of comprehensive income is that under IFRS an entity
can present expenses based on their nature or their function, while US GAAP require all expenses
to be classified by function (PwC, 2016a). The statement of changes in equity must be presented
as a primary statement under IFRS; US GAAP instead permit to present this statement also within
the notes to the financial statements.
Financial researchers have different opinions concerning the US GAAP and IFRS
convergence. On one hand, those supporting the convergence project and the use of global
accounting standards. On the other hand, those arguing that in the future accounting standards will
adapt to the countries peculiarities losing part of their global reach. Notwithstanding the
“magnitude of the differences” that exist between IFRS and US GAAP, McQuilkin and Ruggeri
28 For example, the allowed assessment methods for inventory are quite different. IFRS standards prohibit the use of
last-in, first-out, or LIFO, inventory accounting methods, while US GAAP allow for LIFO. Inventory reversals are
permitted by IFRS under certain conditions, but are not allowed by US GAAP. Both accounting standards allow for
the first-in, first-out method, or FIFO, and the weighted average cost method.
29 In more detail, the criteria to be satisfied are the following:
- “the seller has transferred to the buyer the significant risks and rewards of ownership,
- the seller retains neither continuing managerial involvement to the degree usually associated with ownership nor
effective control over the goods sold,
- the amount of revenue can be measured reliably,
- it is probable that the economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the seller, and
- the costs incurred or to be incurred in respect of the transaction can be measured reliably” (IAS 18).
30 A comparative statement is a document that compares a particular financial statement with prior period statements
or with the same financial report generated by another company.
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(2015) state that the advantages of a global financial reporting system outweigh the disadvantages.
However, it is necessary a step-by-step analysis of the process due to the several changes that the
IFRS adoption in US requires (Chatterjee et al., 2016). Kothari et al. (2009) affirm that the
“competition between the FASB and IASB is the most effective means of achieving a set of U.S.
GAAP rules that are likely to facilitate efficient capital allocation.” However, they argue that
unlikely a single global standard setter like the IASB can survive and succeed and that
“international standards are likely to modify and adapt those standards to local conditions”. Indeed,
countries differ in many aspects, including political and legal regimes, institutional development,
corruption, and culture (Bushman and Landsman, 2010).
2.1.3 The impact of mandatory disclosure on the market
When companies increase the levels of disclosure, this reduces “the possibility of information
asymmetries arising either between the firm and its shareholders or among potential buyers and
sellers of firm shares” (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Financial research provides insights on the
role of accounting mandatory disclosure on the capital markets. The first part presents a new
disclosure measure, which captures the level of disaggregation of accounting data in firms’ annual
reports. Second, the literature about the relation between earnings and market features, in particular
the cost of capital, is briefly reviewed. The last part concentrates on the role of accounting
standards, in particular on the effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS standards by the European
Union and around the world on the capital markets.
Measuring disclosure
In accounting research, there are two main types of disclosure measures: voluntary disclosure
measures and measures that capture firms’ overall disclosure quality. The first type includes
management earnings forecasts and conference calls; therefore, these measures are based on
forward-looking information provided by management. The second type of disclosure measures
are subjective disclosure indices constructed by researchers (e.g., Botosan, 1997) or by analysts
(e.g., AIMR scores). 31 Chen et al. (2015) argue that the latter disclosure measures are “sometimes
31 Botosan (1997) elaborates a disclosure index (DSCORE), whose items reflect five categories of voluntary
information identified by investors and financial analysts as useful in investment decision-making. The five categories
are (1) background information, (2) summary of historical results, (3) key non-financial statistics, (4) projected
information and (5) management discussion and analysis. The AIMR scores represent analysts’ assessment of the
informativeness of the firms’ overall disclosure practices. The higher AIMR scores, the more informative financial
disclosures. Lang and Lundholm (1996) summarize their evaluation about firm’s disclosures using a score in each of
the following categories: annual published information, other published information (including quarterly, press
releases and proxy statements) and investor relations.
21
loosely referred to as voluntary disclosure measures”. Indeed, these measures includes both
voluntary and mandatory elements.
A disclosure measure for mandatory information is developed by Chen et al. (2015). They
propose the Disaggregation Quality (DQ), which captures the level of disaggregation of accounting
data in firms’ annual reports through a count of nonmissing Compustat line items, and reflects the
extent of details in firms’ annual reports. DQ is “an overall measure of the fineness of financial
statement information” presented in firms’ annual reports. DQ differs from voluntary disclosure
measures, because it captures the quality of historical information in mandatory filings instead of
voluntary forecasts. In addition, DQ is different from measures capturing firms’ overall disclosure
quality. Indeed, it is based on all Balance Sheet and Income Statement line items, either reported
in the financial statements or in the footnotes, not just on the items judged to be most important by
researchers and analysts. Thus, DQ is more objective. There is a difference also with measures of
disclosure readability, such as the Gunning Fog Index (Li, 2008). DQ captures the level of details
of accounting data items included in annual reports, while the Fog index, developed by Robert
Gunning, captures text complexity as a function of syllables per word and words per sentence.
Empirical evidence shows that higher DQ is associated with lower forecast dispersion and
higher forecast accuracy. This is “consistent with DQ capturing disclosure quality” and inconsistent
with DQ capturing complexity of operations. Therefore, the number of nonmissing items for each
firm-year captures how detailed firms’ financial statements are and can be used as an overall
measure of disclosure quality of the company’s annual reports filed that year. Furthermore, DQ is
negatively associated with bid-ask spread and cost of equity.32
DQ measure presents both advantages and caveats. It can be easily replicated because it can
be constructed for all Compustat industrial firms, is stingy, and is based on data readable by
machines. In addition, “DQ can be constructed for each firm-year and does not require time-series
data to compute” (Chen et al., 2015). Finally, this measure captures a unique aspect of disclosure
quality, the level of details of accounting data in annual reports; therefore, it can be used together
with the other types of disclosure measures. DQ has two disadvantages. First, it does not distinguish
between recognition (financial statement items) and disclosure (footnote items). Second, it captures
classification shifting under only certain circumstances (Chen et al., 2015).
Prior to Chen et al. (2015), other authors (e.g. Fairfield et al., 1996 and Hermann et al.,
2000) have examined the relation between the earnings disaggregation and the market. Fairfield et
32 Chen et al. (2015) prove the consistency of DQ through three sets of validation tests.
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al. (1996) investigate whether the line items on the income statement can be used to improve
forecasts of future profitability. Empirical evidence demonstrates that “disaggregating earnings is
useful in forecasting future profitability”. For the average firm, disaggregating earnings into
operating income, non-operating income and income taxes, special items, and extraordinary items
and discontinued operations increases the predictive ability of financial statement.33 Hermann et
al. (2000) “evaluates and compares the income reporting practices of retail and manufacturing firms
in the USA and Japan by (i) estimating the persistence coefficients of earnings components and (ii)
measuring the improvement in forecast accuracy achieved by earnings disaggregation”. They find
that greater earnings disaggregation increases the informativeness of earnings in both countries.
Furthermore, the accuracy of earnings forecasts for both countries significantly improves with each
successive disaggregation of earnings. Fairfield et al. (1996) and Hermann et al. (2000) differ for
the found level of disaggregation improving forecast accuracy. According to Fairfield et al. (1996)
beyond this level of disaggregation (i.e. operating income, non-operating income plus taxes, special
items, and nonrecurring items) forecast accuracy does not improve. While Hermann et al. (2000)
find improvements in forecast accuracy also at further levels of earnings disaggregation. The slight
difference between their results is likely due to sample composition and/or time-period.34
Summarizing, Fairfield et al. (1996), Hermann et al. (2000) and Chen et al. (2015) conclude
that the higher the level of disaggregation in financial reports, the higher is the analyst forecast
accuracy. Therefore, the level of disaggregation can be associated to mandatory disclosure quality.
The role of disclosure of fundamentals
Among firms’ fundamentals, earnings are likely to be the most studied value. Earnings
represent a critical financial accounting information, because they show the company’s
profitability. According to Francis et al. (2004), earnings have seven attributes: “quality,
persistence, predictability, smoothness, value relevance, timeliness and conservatism”. The first
four are accounting-based attributes, because they are typically based on accounting information
only. The last three attributes are “market-based”, because these measures are based on the
estimated relation between accounting earnings and market prices or returns.
33 As concerns extraordinary items and discontinued operations, Fairfield et al. (1996) argue that they can be ignored
in forecasting future profitability. While special items are informative even if they do not reflect normal operations,
because they are likely to recur (Chen et al., 2015).
34 Fairfield et al. (1996) include all nonfinancial firms over the 1973-90 period, while Hermann et al. (2000) include
only manufacturing and retail firms over the 1985-94 period.
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Several financial researchers have deepened the relation between earnings and their
attributes, and the market, in particular the cost of capital (e.g. Collins et al., 1997; Francis et al.,
2004). Bhattacharya et al. (2003a) investigate the earnings from another point of view: they analyse
the earnings lack of information and their impact on equity markets. In wider terms, Lambert et al.
(2007) examine the effects of mandatory disclosure of accounting information.
Collins et al. (1997) investigate systematic changes in the value-relevance of earnings and
book values over time. Prior research claims a loss in value-relevance of earnings.35 In contrast to
those claims, Collins et al. (1997) find that “the combined value-relevance of earnings and book
values has not declined over the past forty years and, in fact, appears to have increased slightly”.
Second, the decline in the value-relevance of ‘bottom line’ earnings has been replaced by
incremental value-relevance of book values. Finally, the shift in value-relevance from earnings to
book values can mainly be explained by the incremental significance of one-time items, “the
increased frequency of negative earnings, and changes in average firm size and intangible intensity
across time”.
Francis et al. (2004) analyse the relation between accounting earnings attributes and
investors’ decisions about resource allocation, using the cost of equity capital as a “summary
indicator” of those decisions. Consistent with expectations based on previous research, they find a
“statistically reliable association, in both cross-sectional and time-series tests, between each
attribute considered individually and measures of the cost of equity capital”.36 Estimating
conditional associations that include all seven earnings attributes, the results show that the market-
based attributes (i.e. value relevance, timeliness and conservatism) are dominated by the
accounting-based attributes (i.e. quality, persistence, predictability and smoothness).
Bhattacharya et al. (2003a) examine earnings from another perspective. They measure the
earnings opacity, i.e. the earnings lack of information. They hypothesize that earnings
aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earnings smoothing are associated with uninformative or
opaque earnings. The purpose is to investigate whether informational risk related to accounting
earnings may impact equity markets around the world. Combining the three measures of earnings
opacity they obtain an “overall earnings opacity time-series measure per country”, which is
associated with variables that might impact the overall quality of a country financial reporting
35 See Lev (1997), Ramesh and Thiagarajan (1995), Amir and Lev (1996).
36 Francis et al. (2004) cross-sectional tests demonstrate that earnings quality, earnings persistence and value relevance
have strong conditional effects on the cost of equity capital. In time-series tests, only the two accounting-based
attributes, quality and persistence, have significant conditional effects.
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regime. After controlling for other influences, they find that greater overall earnings opacity in a
country causes higher cost of equity and lower volume of trading in the stock market of that
country.37
More generally, Lambert et al. (2007) concentrate their financial research on the link between
the mandatory disclosure of accounting information and the cost of capital of firms, which is “one
of the most fundamental issues in accounting”. An increase in the quality of mandated disclosures
should in general reduce the cost of capital for all firms in the economy. However, empirical
evidence shows that “the firms’ expected returns (and cost of capital) do not change by the same
proportion for all firms”. In conclusion, even if the value relevance of earnings has decreased in
the last years in favour of book values, there is still a negative association between earnings and
the cost of capital.
The effect of accounting standards on capital markets: the IFRS case
Part of the corporate mandatory disclosure is defined by the accounting standards. The
accounting standards support firms in preparing the financial statements that present their
performance to the public. The introduction of IFRS for listed companies in many countries around
the world is one of the most significant regulatory changes in accounting history (Daske et al.,
2008). The purpose of IFRS is to enhance comparability of financial statements, improve corporate
transparency, increase the quality of financial reporting, and hence benefit investors in general
(e.g., EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). The regulators’ expectations were ambitious and several
financial researchers examine the effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS by the European Union
and around the world on the capital markets. The first group of papers considered analyses the
association between mandatory IFRS adoption and the economic consequences on the capital
markets (e.g. Daske et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011; Li, 2010). Instead Landsman et al. (2012)
focuses on the information content of annual earnings announcements following mandatory IFRS
adoption in 16 countries. Christensen et al. (2013) also investigate the liquidity benefits around
mandatory IFRS adoption, but their results are mixed compared to previous papers. Finally, Barth
et al. (2008) examine whether application of IAS/IFRS is associated with higher accounting
quality.
Based on a sample of over 3,100 firms in 26 countries, Daske et al. (2008) provide early
evidence on the capital-market effects of IFRS adoption. They find that mandatory adopters
37 Bhattacharya et al. (2003a) employ two distinct approaches to measure the effect of the cost of equity: dividend
discount model and international asset pricing factor model.
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experience statistically significant increases in market liquidity after IFRS reporting becomes
mandatory, but only in countries with a relatively strong rule of law. Consistent with the liquidity
improvements, they also document a decrease in firms’ cost of capital and a corresponding increase
in Tobin’s q, when accounting for the possibility that these effects occur prior to the official IFRS
adoption date.38 “The latter suggests that the market anticipates the economic consequences of the
mandate”.
The positive effect of mandatory IFRS adoption in countries with strong legal regime is
documented also by Byard et al. (2011), who analyse the impact of the mandate on analyst side.
Empirical evidence shows a decrease in forecast errors and in forecast dispersion around mandatory
IFRS adoption, but only in countries with strong legal regimes that have also large differences
between local GAAP and IFRS. On the contrary, they find no statistically significant differences
in the other countries adopting IFRS. They conclude that “simply mandating IFRS is not sufficient
to ensure actual changes to firms’ financial reporting practices”.
Li (2010) examines the effect of mandatory IFRS application on cost of capital. The evidence
provides that mandatory IFRS adoption lowers significantly firms’ cost of capital. Results suggest
that “increased disclosure and enhanced comparability are two mechanisms behind the cost of
equity effects of mandatory IFRS adoption”. Mandatory adopters experience a significant
reduction in the cost of capital, around 47 basis points. However, this reduction is significant only
in countries with strong legal enforcement mechanisms.
Focusing on the information content of annual earnings announcements, Landsman et al.
(2012) find that firms in countries having adopted IFRS experience a greater increase in abnormal
return volatility and abnormal trading volume than firms from non-IFRS adopting countries. In
addition, empirical evidence shows that firms from countries with strong enforcement experienced
a greater change in information content than firms from countries with weak enforcement.
In sum, these studies provide evidence that mandatory IFRS reporting yields “significant
capital-market benefits as long as countries have strong legal and institutional systems” ensuring
that the new standards are properly implemented and enforced (Christensen et al., 2013). On the
contrary, the results of Christensen et al. (2013) are inconsistent with the view that mandatory IFRS
reporting has widespread positive capital-market effects in countries that have high levels of
enforcement and strong institutions. They find that “liquidity improves around substantive changes
38 Tobin’s q ratio is calculated as the market value of a company divided by the replacement value of the firm’s assets.
It is based on the hypothesis, formulated by James Tobin, that the combined market value of all the companies on the
stock market should be more or less equal to their replacement costs.
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in enforcement but not around IFRS adoption”, suggesting that changes in financial reporting
enforcement play a crucial role for the observed liquidity effects.
Barth et al. (2008) investigate the effect of IAS/IFRS application, which is intended as “the
combined effect of the features of the financial reporting system”, on the accounting quality.39 The
accounting quality increases in case of less earnings management, more timely loss recognition
and higher value relevance. In the postadoption period firms applying IFRS generally evidence less
earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance of accounting
amounts than do firms not applying IFRS. However, the differences between firms applying IFRS
and those not implementing these accounting standards in the preadoption period do not explain
the registered gap in the postadoption period. Furthermore, “firms applying IFRS exhibit higher
accounting quality in the postadoption period” than in the preadoption period, although almost all
of the differences in changes in accounting quality metrics are not significant.
In conclusion, some financial researchers (e.g. Daske et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011; Li,
2010; Landsman et al., 2012) find that the introduction of IFRS have had a positive impact mainly
in countries with strong legal regime and strong legal enforcement. On the contrary, Christensen
et al. (2013) state that the observed economic consequences are due to the changes in financial
reporting enforcement rather than to mandatory IFRS adoption. Finally, Barth et al. (2008) find a
positive association between mandatory IFRS adoption and accounting quality in the postadoption
period.
39 The financial reporting system is made by the accounting standards and their interpretation, enforcement and
litigation.
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2.2 Voluntary disclosure
Voluntary disclosure represents an alternative communication tool at disposal of companies.
Firms provide voluntary information through different channels, such as analysts’ presentations
and conference calls, quarterly press releases, announcements on internet sites, management
forecasts and other corporate reports. Since firms’ owners delegated to the managers the run of the
business, voluntary disclosure has become important and necessary (Adina and Ion, 2008). The
purpose of voluntary disclosure is to enrich information disclosed under regulatory requirements.
Soft information and non-GAAP measures are two aspects of voluntary disclosure. Textual
or soft information can give context to the quantitative data, provide more information about
managerial expectations, and identify important qualifiers or caveats that cannot be deduced from
numerical data (Ferris et al., 2013). NGMs are “financial measures […] other than financial
measures defined or specified in the applicable financial reporting framework” (ESMA, 2015).
They represent one of the main corporate managers’ voluntary disclosures.
This section proceeds as follows. Section 2.2.1 provides a review of the recent regulation
regarding soft information in US and in the European Union, and presents textual analysis features
and the related literature. Section 2.2.2 deals with non-GAAP reporting and focuses on non-GAAP
earnings determinants, exclusions and regulations.
2.2.1 Soft information
Soft information can be considered a completion of quantitative analysis, i.e. hard
information. One way to investigate soft information is through textual analysis, whose aim is to
describe the content and the features of texts. An aspect of textual analysis is readability. A text is
more or less readable according to the effort required to understand the annual reports content.
Regulators and other authorities have intervened also to improve the quality and readability
of soft information in financial reporting. In US, the Plain English Mandate (1998) provides rules
to make filings and prospectuses more readable and informative. Instead, in the EU IASB has
promoted the Disclosure Initiative (2013). In particular, the Principles of Disclosure project aims
to solve the so-called ‘disclosure problem’.
Regulation
Even if voluntary disclosure is defined as disclosures that are not explicitly required by
regulations, laws or accounting standards, in recent years there have been some regulatory
interventions to improve the quality of information, other than mandatory disclosure, provided by
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the companies. In US, the SEC issued Plain English Mandate, which became effective since 1
October 1998.40 The purpose is “to enhance the readability, quality, and presentation of financial
reports, including prospectuses” (Ferris et al., 2013). Filings involved are any prospectus or
security registrations (e.g. Forms 424, S-1, F-1, and their variants). Firms filing a compulsory
prospectus are required to use plain-language. However, SEC encourage firms “to adopt these
principles in all their filings and communications with shareholders” (Loughran and McDonald,
2014b).
The plain English rule [Rule 421(d)] requires companies to prepare the front page of their
prospectuses substantially complying with the following six plain English principles:
- Short sentences;
- Definite, concrete, everyday language;
- Active voice;
- Tabular presentation or bullet lists for complex material, whenever possible;
- No legal jargon or highly technical business terms; and
- No multiple negatives.
Furthermore, Rule 421(b) currently requires the entire prospectus to be clear, concise, and
understandable. The following techniques are required when writing the entire prospectus:
- Present information in clear, concise sections, paragraphs, and sentences. Whenever
possible, use short explanatory sentences and bullet lists;
- Use descriptive headings and subheadings;
- Avoid frequent reliance on glossaries or defined terms as the primary means of explaining
information in the prospectus. Define terms in a glossary or other section of the document
only if the meaning is unclear from the context. Use a glossary only if it facilitates
understanding of the disclosure; and
- Avoid legal and highly technical business terminology.
Finally, the plain English Handbook, released in August 1998, shows how to create clear SEC
disclosure documents following well-established techniques for writing in plain English. Clearly,
when drafting a document for filing with the SEC, companies must first meet all legal requirements.
Financial research analyses the effects of Plain English Mandate on accounting disclosure.
Loughran and McDonald (2014b), Elliot et al. (2015) and Bonsall IV et al. (2017) utilize the plain
40 SEC, 17 CFR Parts 228, 229, 230, 239 and 274 [Release Nos. 33-7497; 34-39593; IC -23011 International Series
No. 1113; File No. S7-3-97]
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English attributes and principles as base of some disclosure measures. All of them conclude that
this regulation contributes to the increased readability of firms’ filings and prospectuses. To
evaluate the impact of plain English on “managers’ disclosure style”, Loughran and McDonald
(2014b) analyse Form 424, IPO prospectus, and 10-K filings over 1994-2009. They create a
“standardized measure that aggregates six writing components” (sentence length, word length,
passive voice, legalese, personal pronouns, and negative/superfluous phrases). Empirical evidence
shows a dramatic impact of the Plain English Mandate and “the changes are observed in both
mandated and non-mandated filings”. Hence, the plain English rule substantially influence
managerial behaviour.
Elliot et al. (2015) instead test the impact of more concrete language in disclosures on
investors’ willingness to invest in a firm. The reason is that “concrete language facilitates
visualization and is less open to interpretation because it is more specific and contextualized”. They
find that the more concrete language is highlighted in a prospectus, the more investors are willing
to invest in a firm. The plain English principles are the base of measures of financial reporting
readability also in Bonsall IV et al. (2017). Their first measure is the Bog index, which incorporates
negative and positive plain English attributes.41 The second one is a “summary measure of
readability that captures a broad range of plain English attributes” and it called Plain English
Factor.42 According to the results, firms filing prospectus experience lower values of both indexes
over time, i.e. the documents are more readable.
 Similarly, IASB has launched the Disclosure Initiative in 2013. The objective is to improve
the effectiveness of disclosures in financial statements. Currently, the Disclosure Initiative includes
six projects:
1. Amendments to IAS 1 to remove barriers to the exercise of judgment;
2. Amendments to IAS 7 to improve disclosure of liabilities from financing activities;
3. The Materiality Practice Statement project;
4. The Definition of Material project;
5. The Principles of Disclosure project;
6. The Standards-level Review of Disclosures project.43
41 The Bog Index is measured by Sentence Bog + Word Bog - Pep. The higher Bog Index, the less readable is the
document.
42 The Plain English Factor includes ten measures of plain English problems: passive verbs, hidden verbs, wordy
phrases, legal words, jargon phrases, specialist words, abstract words, Bog Index, long sentences, and number of words.
43 Amendments to IAS 1 and Amendments to IAS 7 are completed projects. The materiality implementation projects
are related to the fact that financial statements may not contain enough relevant information and may include irrelevant
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The Principles of Disclosure aims to identify disclosure issues and address them by developing
new or clarifying existing principles of disclosure in IFRS Standards. IASB has identified three
main concerns about disclosures in the financial statements, collectively termed as the ‘disclosure
problem’:
- Not enough relevant information, which can lead to inappropriate investing or lending
decisions;
- Irrelevant information, which can obscure relevant information and reduce information and
understandability of financial statements;
- Ineffective communication, which can reduce understandability of financial statements.
The Discussion Paper related Principles of Disclosure project identifies seven principles to help
entities communicating information more effectively in their financial statements. Information in
financial statements should be (1) entity-specific; (2) clear and simple; (3) organized to highlight
important matters; (4) linked to related information; (5) free from unnecessary duplication; (6)
comparable; (7) in an appropriate format. Based on the comments to the Discussion Paper, the
Board will decide whether to develop an Exposure Draft of proposals to amend or replace parts of
IAS 1 – Presentation of Financial Statements.
Textual analysis
“Textual analysis is an emerging area in accounting and finance”, consequently there are still
not precise taxonomies (Loughran and McDonald, 2016).44 Textual analysis can be considered as
a subset of qualitative analysis and can be included in “the categories of either targeted phrases,
sentiment analysis, topic modelling, or measures of document similarity”.45 Readability represents
another aspect of textual analysis and it “attempts to measure the ability of the reader to decipher
the intended message”.
The methods that use textual analysis focus on specific words or phrases. For these methods,
a critical aspect is ‘word lists’. To measure the tone or sentiment of a financial document,
“researchers typically count the number of words associated with a particular sentiment word list
scaled by the total number of words in the document” (Loughran and McDonald, 2016). The word
information. The Standards-level Review of Disclosures project aims to improve disclosure requirements in Standards.
Further information is available at: http://www.ifrs.org/-/media/project/disclosure-initative/disclosure-initiative-
principles-of-disclosure/discussion-paper/education-materials/principles-of-disclosure-snapshot-2017.pdf
44 Many different disciplines use textual analysis, e.g. psychology, anthropology, linguistics, political science,
journalism, and computer science (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Therefore, textual analysis have other labels, such
as content analysis, natural language processing, information retrieval, or computational linguistics.
45 These methods focus on computationally extracting meaning from a collection of text.
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lists are associated to different themes, such as positivity, negativity, uncertainty, litigiousness and
weak and strong modal words.
Financial researchers frequently use the Harvard GI word lists because they are readily
available. However, they were not created for business documents, and this represent their
weakness when applied in financial contexts. Loughran and McDonald (2011) criticize the use of
Harvard GI word lists for corporate disclosure arguing that “almost three-fourths of negative words
from the Harvard dictionary [H4N-Inf list] found in 10-K filings are typically not negative in a
financial context”. For this reason, they create the Fin-Neg list, which contains a list of 2,337 words
that normally have negative implications in a financial sense. Analysing a sample of 10-Ks and 10-
K405s46 over 1994 to 2008, they find that “the median returns for the H4N-Inf list do not reflect a
consistent relation with the proportion of negative words”.47 Conversely, empirical evidence shows
that the Fin-Neg list is significantly associated with announcement returns. The higher the negative
words proportions, the lower the excess returns.48
In addition, Loughran and McDonald (2011) develop other five lists with positive, uncertain,
litigious, strong modal and weak modal words. They analyse the link between the word lists and
filing date returns, volume and postevent volatility. Empirical evidence shows that “firms using
fewer negative, uncertain, modal strong, and modal weak words realize a more positive reaction
from the market in the filing date event window”. Only for the Harvard and Fin-Neg word lists, the
more negative words appear in the 10-k, the higher the abnormal trading volume. Finally, a higher
proportion of positive, negative, or modal words is linked with larger stock return volatility in the
year after the filing. Overall, the results suggest that textual analysis can contribute to the
understanding of the information impact on stock returns.
Following Loughran and McDonald (2011), many financial researchers use their word lists
(hereinafter, L&M word lists) for textual analysis. Usually, L&M word lists, in particular the
negative word list, are used to gauge the tone of filings and prospectuses (e.g. Feldman et al., 2010;
Ferris et al., 2013). Other financial researchers use L&M word lists to measure tone in newspaper
articles/columns (e.g. Dougal et al., 2012). Feldman et al. (2010) examine the impact of changes
46 10-K405s is a form used by SEC prior to 2003. It was used to indicate that an officer or director of a company failed
to file a Form 4 (or similar Form 3 or Form 5) on time, meaning that they did not disclose their insider trading activities
within the required time frame.
47 The H4N-Inf list includes H4N list (2,005 words) and the forms that retain the original meaning of the root word
(2,178 words) for a total of 4,183 words. For example, it includes odd and the plural form odds.
48 However, the adjusted R2 of regression results is very low. This means that “textual analysis explains only a small
amount of variation in filing period returns” (Loughran and McDonald, 2011).
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in Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) tone on the market.49 Using a large sample of 10-
K and 10-Q filings, they find that the more positive the MD&A tone, the higher the stock market
returns. Analysing the Wall Street Journal’s “Abreast of the Market” column, Dougal et al. (2012)
find a positive association between the pessimistic tone of the column and the negative market
returns the following day. Ferris et al. (2013) apply textual analysis on IPO prospectuses. Their
paper examines “the effect that conservatism or cautionary language (measured by negative tone)”
might have on IPO performance. 50 They base their conservatism measure on L&M word list (Fin-
Neg word list), because after performing tests on Harvard, Diction and Fin-Neg word lists, they
conclude that the latter word list is “less likely to select wrong words for use in financial analysis,
given its underlying source documents”.51 Based on empirical evidence they find that conservatism
is useful in explaining IPO pricing and subsequent operating and stock return performance.
Research on the readability in the accounting field is substantial. However, early works are
based on small samples or problematic methodologies (Loughran and McDonald, 2016). The first
paper using a meaningful sample is Li (2008), which examines the extent to which annual report
readability is related to firm performance and earnings persistence. Instead, Lehavy et al. (2011)
analyse the relation between the readability of firms’ written communication and financial analysts.
Focusing on the investors’ side, Lawrence (2013) investigates whether clearer and more concise
financial disclosures can benefit individual investors. Regarding readability measures, De Franco
et al. (2015) formulate two measures (straightforward language and conciseness) to analyse the
readability of analyst reports and its link with investor behaviour. Loughran and McDonald (2014a)
measure the “effective communication of information” using a file size metric. Finally, Bonsall IV
et al. (2017) develop two measures of financial reporting readability based on plain English
principles.
Using a sample of 55,719 firm-years with annual report filing dates between 1994 and 2004,
Li (2008) examines the relation between annual report readability and firm performance and
earnings persistence. The annual report readability is measured by the Gunning Fog Index
(hereinafter, Fog Index), which captures text complexity as a function of syllables per words and
words per sentence, and of the document length.52 The Fog Index indicates the number of years of
49 Management discussion and analysis (MD&A) is the section of a company’s annual report in which management
provides an overview of the previous year’s operations and how the company performed financially.
50 The conservatism measure is calculated as negative words over total words times 100.
51 Diction is a computer-aided text analysis program that uses predefined dictionaries related to five semantic
features (Activity, Optimism, Certainty, Realism and Commonality).
52 Li (2008) states that “everything else equal, longer documents seem to be deterring and more difficult to read”.
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formal education a reader of average intelligence would need to read the text once and understand
that piece of writing with its word-sentence workload.53 Concerning firm performance, Li (2008)
finds that firms with poor performance have annual reports that are harder to read (i.e., high Fog
Index values or high word counts). The results are statistically (but not economically) significant.
Li also finds that companies with more readable annual reports have higher earnings persistence.
The effect is economically significant. Putting everything together, empirical evidence suggests
that “managers may be opportunistically structuring the annual reports to hide adverse information
from investors”.
Lehavy et al. (2011) assess whether the readability of firm communication affects analyst
behaviour. In particular, they investigate (i) the effect of disclosure readability on analyst
following; (ii)  the association between individual analyst effort and the readability of 10-K filing;
(iii) the relation between 10-K readability and the information content of analyst reports; (iv) the
effect of disclosure on analyst earnings forecast properties, i.e. dispersion, accuracy, overall and
common uncertainty. Based on a sample of 33,704 firm-year observations for fiscal years 1995–
2006, Lehavy et al. (2011) find “a positive and significant association between a firm’s 10-K Fog
index and the number of analysts who cover the firm”. To measure the analyst effort, they calculate
the “analyst report duration”, which is the number of days between the 10-K disclosure and the
analyst report following the filing. Empirical evidence shows that the less readable the 10-K filings,
the longer the time for analyst to issue their reports. Concerning the information content of analyst
reports, Lehavy et al. (2011) find that “analyst reports of firms with less readable 10-K reports are
more informative to investors”. Finally, the properties of analyst earnings forecasts for firms with
less readable 10-K reports are the following: (i) they prove to have greater dispersion; (ii) they are
less accurate; and (iii) they are associated with greater overall analyst uncertainty. Furthermore,
(iv) “analyst common uncertainty is increasing in 10-K Fog”. Summarizing all the results, Lehavy
et al. (2011) conclude that there is a relation between analyst behaviour and the readability of firms’
communication.
Lawrence (2013) examines the relation between “clearer and more concise financial
disclosures” and individual investors. The financial disclosure quality measures are the Fog index
and the length of annual report, as in Li (2008). Based on a sample of 91,228 account-firm-year
53 The Gunning Fog Index is calculated as follows:
Fog = (words_per_sentence + percent_of_complex_words) * 0.4
FOG≥18 means the text is unreadable; 14–18 (difficult); 12–14 (ideal); 10–12 (acceptable); and 8–10 (childish).
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observations with 1,555 separate firm-year observations, Lawrence (2013) finds that on average,
individuals invest more in firms whose annual reports contain fewer words and have lower Fog
index. Specifically, the more annual reports disclosures are readable and concise, the higher are
individuals’ shareholdings. In addition, abnormal returns are positively affected by the higher
quality of financial disclosure. Indeed, “individual investors’ abnormal returns are increasing in
clearer and more concise disclosures”.
To analyse the readability of analyst reports, De Franco et al. (2015) develop two readability
measures, i.e. straightforward language and conciseness. The straightforward language is measured
by the Fog index and the Flesch index. The latter consists of the Flesch-Kincaid and the Flesch
Reading Ease.54 Averaging the three measures, they obtain an aggregate measure of straightforward
language. 55 To measure conciseness, they follow Li (2008) and use the length of the report. This
measure is characterized by two components: the number of words and the number of characters
in the report. As for straightforward language, they elaborate an aggregate measure of conciseness.
Based on a large database of analysts’ reports from 2002 to 2009, De Franco et al. (2015) analyse
their readability and their link with investor behaviour. The empirical evidence demonstrates that
more readable reports are issued by analysts having more experience, issuing more timely
forecasts, revising forecasts more frequently and issuing more accurate forecasts. Hence, “high
ability analysts provide more readable reports”.
The objective of Loughran and McDonald (2014a) is to find the most suitable measure for
annual report readability. Starting from the Fog index (the most commonly applied measure of
readability) they demonstrate that it is “poorly specified when used to evaluate financial
documents”. The critical elements are the Fog index components, i.e. the words per sentence and
the percentage of complex words. First, they argue that measuring sentence length in financial
reports is “substantially less precise” than counting words per sentence in traditional prose. Second,
counting syllables per word is not effective in measuring business documents’ readability. Indeed,
“by far the most frequently occurring complex words” (more than two syllables) are words such as
“financial, company, operations, management, employees, and customers, which are easily
54 Flesch-Kincaid index is calculated as follows:
Flesch-Kincaid = (11.8 × syllables per word) + (0.39 × words per sentence) – 15.59
While the Flesch Reading Ease is calculated as:
Flesch Reading Ease = 206.8 – (1.015 × words per sentence) – (84.6 × syllables per word)
55 As the Fog index, the Flesch measures are linear combinations of sentence length and syllables-based word length.
“Flesch–Kincaid, similar to Fog, produces a grade-level measure but uses the average number of syllables per word as
the second term”, instead of percent of complex words (Loughran and McDonald, 2016). The Flesch Reading Ease
measure uses the same inputs as Flesch–Kincaid, but the output is a score from 0 to 100.
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understood by investors”. Therefore, the increase in the percentage of complex words (counting
for half of the value) leads to a decrease in the Fog index (i.e. the report is less readable), that does
not completely reflect the actual readability of financial disclosures. Consistently, they find that
“the Fog Index is not significant in explaining analyst dispersion or earnings surprises”. In
alternative to the Fog index, Loughran and McDonald (2014a) propose “the natural log of gross
10-K file size”, which is available on the SEC’s EDGAR Web site. This measure has different
advantages: (i) easy to determine, (ii) “not prone to the substantial measurement errors”, (iii) easy
to replicate, and (iv) highly correlated with alternative measures of readability. Empirical evidence
shows that there is a significant and positive association between large 10-Ks and high return
volatility, earnings forecast errors, and earnings forecast dispersion.
However, Bonsall IV et al. (2017) criticize the ‘file size of 10-K’ as measure of readability
for three reasons. First, it captures only one plain English attribute, i.e. clear presentation of
complex information. Second, it does not consider the tone of the document, which is based on the
actual language used in the document. Third, “text length explains only a minor portion of the
variation in file size”.56 These weaknesses are primarily due to the growth of non-textual
components in 10-K filings. The empirical evidence suggests that “file size appears to be a poorly
specified measure of financial reporting readability”. Given the shortcomings of Loughran and
McDonald's (2014a) proposed measure of readability, Bonsall IV et al. (2017) develop their own
measures of financial reporting readability based on the plain English attributes, i.e. the Bog Index
and the Plain English Factor. To test their comprehensive measure of financial reporting
readability, they use “a quasi-exogenous shock”, i.e. the 1998 Plain English Mandate”. They expect
the prospectuses and filings of firms affected by the regulation to be more readable than those prior
to 1998. Consistently. they find significant improvements in their measures of readability following
the Plain English Mandate. On the contrary, the file size of 10-K does not significantly decrease
over the same period suggesting that this measure does not capture the plain English attributes.
In conclusion, the measures of readability aim to capture the individual’s ability to
understand the information provided in the annual report. Financial researchers have extensively
used the Fog index to measure readability (e.g. Li, 2008; Lehavy et al., 2011; Lawrence, 2013; De
Franco et al., 2015). However, according to Loughran and McDonald (2014a), the Fog index is
ineffective to evaluate financial documents. They propose an alternative, i.e. the natural log of
56 Bonsall IV et al. (2017) provide that “the average 10-K filing size on EDGAR in 2012 is 12.48 megabytes, but the
average file size of the text is only 0.28 megabytes”.
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gross 10-K file size, which is statistically significant. In contrast, Bonsall IV et al. (2017) state that
the file size of 10-K is not appropriate to measure financial reporting readability due to its
shortcomings. In alternative, they elaborate the Bog Index and the Plain English Factor, which are
based on Plain English attributes and are both statistically significant.
2.2.2 Non-GAAP disclosure
Non-GAAP measures (NGMs) are one of the main corporate managers’ voluntary
disclosures. SEC (2003) states that “non-GAAP financial amount is a numerical measure of a
registrant’s historical or future financial performance, financial position, or cash flows that exclude
(include) amounts that are included (excluded) from the most directly comparable measure
calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP”. NGMs are also known as Pro Forma, Street,
Core, or Operating earnings. Similarly, in the European Union, ESMA (2015) defines Alternative
Performance Measures (APMs) as “financial measures of historical or future financial
performance, financial position, or cash flows, other than financial measures defined or specified
in the applicable financial reporting framework”.
During the equity boom of the late 1990s, managers started to disclose NGMs in press
releases and other management discussions to supplement the reported GAAP financial
information. The main determinants explaining the recent companies’ practice of disclosing NGMs
are the following: (i) value relevance, (ii) reporting ‘better’ performance, (iii) media coverage and
(iv) core business presentation.57 Using a sample of 249 press releases between 1997 and 1999,
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that the disclosure of NGMs is more likely in firms with less
informative GAAP earnings. Further, their findings show that firms reporting GAAP earnings
below analysts’ expectations are more likely to integrate this information with non-GAAP
earnings. Consistently, Bowen et al. (2005) analyse a sample of 1,518 earnings releases and find
that “firms with low value-relevance of earnings place less emphasis on traditional GAAP earnings
and greater relative emphasis on non-GAAP earnings”. Hence, the less GAAP earnings are
informative and value relevant, the more companies disclose non-GAAP earnings to increment the
financial information reported.
The concept of reporting ‘better’ performance is closely related to value relevance. Bowen
et al. (2005) find that managers emphasize the metric, either GAAP earnings or non-GAAP
57 Bowen et al. (2005) discuss determinants hypothesized to influence managers’ emphasis on non-GAAP and GAAP
performance. They analyze the following determinants: value relevance, reporting ‘better’ performance, media
coverage and sophisticated users. However, their results with respect to sophisticated users are generally inconclusive.
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earnings, which portrays the most favourable performance in their quarterly press releases.
Similarly, Lougee and Marquardt (2004) find that firms failing to reach earnings benchmarks are
more likely than other firms to include non-GAAP earnings in their quarterly press releases. Also
Baumker et al. (2013) reports that “managers appear to prefer to report non-GAAP earnings that
improve performance”. The greater media exposure is considered another determinant for the
disclosure of NGMs. Bowen et al. (2005)’s findings suggest that firms emphasize more non-GAAP
earnings and less GAAP earnings if they are subject to greater media exposure. Using analyst-
adjusted earnings numbers as a proxy for managers’ non-GAAP reporting, Doyle et al. (2013)
document that managers use non-GAAP earnings numbers “to meet or beat analyst forecasts”.
Finally, managers claim that NGMs represent better the core business of their companies.
Indeed, in their quarterly press releases, managers report non-GAAP metrics that exclude income
statement items that they consider unusual or non-recurring. For example, Akamai Technologies,
Inc. in its reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures (March 31, 2017) affirms
that ‘Gains and losses on investments’ are “not representative of Akamai’s core business operations
and ongoing operating performance”, therefore the company excludes them from its non-GAAP
financial measures.58
Non-GAAP earnings exclusions
The most common non-GAAP earnings metrics disclosed by companies in their quarterly
press releases are the following: operating earnings; cash earnings; earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Most of the time the manager-adjusted earnings numbers
are higher than the GAAP earnings numbers, because they generally exclude some expense items.
Doyle et al. (2003) defines the difference between non-GAAP earnings and GAAP earnings as
total exclusions. Total exclusions are divided into special items and other exclusions. Special items
represent the difference between operating income and GAAP earnings. Other exclusions are
simply the difference between total exclusions and special items: Prior research defines special
items as exclusions that are “unusual or non-recurring items” (e.g. Doyle et al., 2013; Brown et al.,
2012). Special items are known also as “high quality” exclusions. Conversely, Brown et al. 2012
argue that “low-quality” exclusions or other exclusions are those that persist in future periods and,
therefore, are not fully transitory or unimportant as some managers claim.
58Akamai Technologies, Inc. Reconciliation of GAAP to Non-GAAP Financial Measures. March 31, 2017. Available
at: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:A-mKJbs0pXAJ:phx.corporate-
ir.net/External.File%3Fitem%3DUGFyZW50SUQ9NjY5MzQxfENoaWxkSUQ9Mzc2MzM5fFR5cGU9MQ%3D%
3D%26t%3D1+&cd=5&hl=it&ct=clnk&gl=it
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The increasing disclosure of non-GAAP metrics by companies in press releases stimulates
financial researchers to investigate their properties (Doyle et al., 2003), the most common types of
adjustments made by managers (Black and Christensen, 2009) and the strategic and opportunistic
use of the exclusions by managers (Bowen et al., 2005; Doyle et al., 2013). Examining the
predictive ability of non-GAAP earnings for future performance, Doyle et al. (2003) find that the
expenses excluded from non-GAAP earnings are “far from unimportant or non-recurring”. The
results are even more powerful after distinguishing between special items and other exclusions.
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that special items have little predictive ability for future
performance, (i.e., “they are generally unrelated to future cash flows”), while other exclusions have
significant predictive ability for future performance (i.e., “they are powerfully predictive of
negative future cash flows”). The latter results support the academic statement that other exclusions
are not fully transitory or unrelated to future performance.
Black and Christensen (2009) investigate the extent to which different types of earnings
adjustments affect the ‘gap’ between non-GAAP and GAAP income from continuing operations.
Their results indicate that “four of the most economically significant exclusions are instead
recurring items”: (i) research and development costs, (ii) depreciation and amortization, (iii) tax-
related expenses. In this way, non-GAAP earnings may not always reflect recurring income.
However, managers also exclude income statement items that are “likely non-recurring” (e.g.
restructuring charges and costs associated with the issuance of stock) and “one-time gains”.59
Hence, at least some managers aim to disclose real “core” earnings.
 The purpose of Bowen et al. (2005) is to examine the extent to which managers strategically
highlight performance metrics within their earnings press release. They consider two measures of
emphasis: the level of emphasis (based on where non-GAAP and GAAP earnings are mentioned in
the press release) and relative emphasis (the difference in placement between non-GAAP and
GAAP earnings). Overall, their results underlines the strategic reporting of non-GAAP and/or
GAAP earnings by managers within quarterly press releases. Finally, Doyle et al. (2013)
distinguish between special items and unexpected exclusions (also labelled other exclusions in
prior literature) to examine whether managers opportunistically use non-GAAP metrics and their
exclusions. It appears that the use of other (unexpected) exclusions is the “primary means” by
which managers meet or even exceed analyst forecasts. “The probability of a firm meeting or
59 “Firms excluding one-time gains actually report a non-GAAP earnings number that is lower than GAAP earnings
before extraordinary items” (Black and Christensen, 2009).
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beating increases by 20% when the firm uses other exclusions”, while the results are insignificant
for special items.
 Financial research demonstrates that at least some non-GAAP earnings exclusions (i.e. those
labelled other exclusions, unexpected exclusions or low-quality exclusions) are part of companies’
core business, because they are not one-time items. Hence, managers are likely to use non-GAAP
metrics opportunistically.
Pre- and post-regulations state of art
“The rapid growth and unregulated nature of non-GAAP disclosures [has] raised concerns
among regulators and members of the financial press” at the beginning of the 21th century (Miller,
2009). They argue that non-GAAP earnings disclosures may be confusing or misleading for
investors. Before the regulatory intervention the debate about the use of NGMs among academic
researchers, regulators and market participants takes various forms. On one side, those supporting
the management claims (e.g. Bhattacharya et al., 2003b; Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). Managers
affirm that NGMs represent better the core business of their companies. On the other side, those
underlying that non-GAAP disclosure can be misleading (e.g. Doyle et al., 2003).
Consistent with management claims, Bhattacharya et al. (2003b), analysing short-window
abnormal returns around earnings announcement dates, find that non-GAAP earnings are
significantly more informative than GAAP operating earnings and more persistent. Similarly,
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) documents a “dramatic increase” in the association of non-GAAP
earnings with stock prices and that the market focuses more on non-GAAP earnings than GAAP
earnings. Conversely, Doyle et al. (2003) results support the idea that non-GAAP disclosure
misleads investors. Indeed, they report that the predictive power of the excluded expenses is not
fully appreciated by the market. Further, empirical evidence shows that firms applying relatively
large exclusions to their non-GAAP earnings face relatively lower future cash flows and relatively
lower stock returns over the next three years.
The work of Lougee and Marquardt (2004) does not answer the question of whether non-
GAAP earnings are used by managers to mislead or inform investors. Indeed, their results may be
interpreted as consistent with both sides of the non-GAAP disclosure debate. On one hand, they
find that non-GAAP earnings have “greater relative and incremental information content when
GAAP earnings informativeness is low or when GAAP earnings surprises are positive”. On the
other hand, there is no evidence of “greater relative or incremental information content when prior
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GAAP earnings informativeness is high or the GAAP earnings surprise is negative”. Hence, in the
latter cases investors ignore non-GAAP earnings.
SEC analysed the use of non-GAAP reporting in 2001 and issued a cautionary guidance at
the end of the year. SEC (2001) wishes to caution public companies on the use of non-GAAP
financial information and to alert investors to the potential dangers of such information. Following
the reforms contained in the SOX (2002), the SEC promulgated Reg G in January 2003. Reg G
requires that firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings measures (i) present the most directly
comparable GAAP measure, (ii) reconcile the non-GAAP measure to the most directly GAAP
measure, and (iii) furnish to the Commission a Form 8-K within five business days of any public
announcement or release disclosing material non-public information. Reg G is applicable to all
public non-GAAP financial measure disclosures (e.g. oral, telephonically, press release, internet,
etc.).
 Similarly, ESMA published its final guidelines on APMs for listed issuers in 2015. ESMA
(2015) want “to encourage European issuers to publish transparent, unbiased and comparable
information on their financial performance in order to provide users with a comprehensive
understanding of their performance”. As in US, the regulators’ scope is to ensure that firms disclose
financial information that could not mislead investors, analysts and other important stakeholders.
ESMA’s guidelines are similar to the requirements on the presentation of subtotals introduced by
IASB ‘Disclosure Initiative – Amendments to IAS 1’ (KPMG, 2017). The amendments to IAS 1
relate to (i) materiality, (ii) order of the notes, (iii) subtotals, (iv) accounting policies, and (v)
disaggregation and are designed to further encourage companies to apply professional judgment in
determining what information to disclose in their financial statements. Concerning subtotals, IAS
1 now requires that they should:
- Contain only items recognised and measured in accordance with IFRS;
- Be presented and labelled in such a way that the subtotal is understandable; and
- Be consistent from one period to the next.
Moreover, voluntary subtotals must not be presented with more prominence than subtotals required
by the standard. Finally, any voluntary subtotals must be reconciled to the required subtotals by
presenting each excluded item.
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Academic research has explored the intended and unintended effects of Reg G.60 The success
of the U.S. Congress’ and the SEC’s efforts should result in fewer firms disclosing non-GAAP
earnings that mislead investors (intended consequence). However, managers may opportunistically
exclude NGMs when those are lower than GAAP measures. Therefore, there could be fewer firms
disclosing non-GAAP earnings having more informative power (unintended consequence).
Entwistle et al. (2006) analyse annual earnings press releases of all firms listed on the U.S. S&P
500 index for three years, 2001-2003. Their sample covers the period both prior and subsequent to
the SEC regulation. The results display that “the number of firms reported non-GAAP earnings in
a manner that could potentially mislead investors reduced from 53 in 2001 –over 10% of all S&P
500 firms– to 3 only two years later”. They conclude that SEC regulation was “both necessary and
effective”. Consistently, Han (2012) find that the disclosure requirements provided by Reg G
“discouraged managers from opportunistically disclosing non-GAAP earnings”. Consequently,
investors perceive the remaining non-GAAP earnings as more transparent after Reg G
implementation. On the contrary, Baumker et al. (2013) reports that there continues to be an
opportunistic component of non-GAAP reporting following Reg G. Indeed, they document “a sharp
and continued decline in the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings excluding transitory gains following
Reg G, which is likely an unintended consequence of this regulation”. Managers appear to prefer
to disclose NGMs reporting ‘better’ performance.
Black et al. (2015) examines whether the regulatory requirements imposed by SOX and Reg
G have changed “managers’ use of aggressive non-GAAP reporting practices” (opportunistic
behaviour). The results suggest that the new regulatory requirements has, to some extent, succeeded
in their purpose to reduce the number of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings that mislead
investors. Indeed, aggressive non-GAAP reporting has generally decreased in the post-SOX period.
However, some firms continue to use non-GAAP exclusions opportunistically. For example, Doyle
et al. (2013) states that managers opportunistically use non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analysts
forecasts. Through non-GAAP reporting, companies are more likely to meet or beat analyst
forecasts, indicating that “analysts do not fully anticipate and unwind the exclusions that managers
propose at the time of the earnings announcement”.
An important mechanism that could mitigate the effects of non-GAAP reporting is corporate
governance. Corporate governance is the system of rules, practices and processes by which a
60 Unfortunately there is not evidence on the effects of Disclosure Initiative yet, because it is effective for annual
periods beginning on or after 1 January 2016.
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company is directed and controlled. Jennings and Marques (2011) investigate the joint effects of
corporate governance and regulation on the disclosure of manager-adjusted non-GAAP earnings
in the U.S. The results suggest that “before the SEC intervention strong corporate governance was
effective at protecting investors from misleading non-GAAP adjustments, but that investors were
misled by adjustments made by firms with weaker corporate governance”. However, the results
also indicate that investor are no more misled by firms with weaker corporate governance. This
suggests that “corporate governance can be viewed as a substitute for regulation”.
In conclusion, financial research suggests that the disclosure of NGMs could be misleading
for the public also in the post-SOX regulatory environment and that their misuse can be mitigated
by strong corporate governance. Consistently, SEC continues to raise concerns regarding non-
GAAP reporting. Recently, the SEC staff have updated its interpretive guidance ‘Compliance &
Disclosure Interpretations’ (“C&Dis”) on non-GAAP financial measures. C&Dis comprise the
Division’s interpretations of the rules and regulations on the use of non-GAAP financial measures.
This guidance provides examples of NGMs potentially misleading and against Reg G (e.g. NGMs
excluding non-recurring expenses, but including non-recurring gains) and disclosure examples in
which NGMs are more prominent than the most directly comparable GAAP measures.
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3. Balance sheet analysis
3.1 Background and hypothesis development
Background.
The balance sheet, also known as “statement of financial position”, presents company assets,
liabilities and shareholders’ equity at a certain point in time. Reading the balance sheet investors
gain awareness of what the company owns and owes, and the amount invested by shareholders. In
US, SEC Regulation S-X, Article 5, Rule 5-02 (hereinafter, “Reg S-X 5-02”) mandates the
presentation of a classified balance sheet. In particular, Rule 5-02 indicates “the various line items
and certain additional disclosures which, if applicable, […] should appear on the face of the balance
sheets or related notes”. The rules governing the presentation of the balance sheet items aim to
ensure comparability among companies’ financial statements and to grant a certain level of
disaggregation.61
Some studies investigate the level of disaggregation in the financial statements and conclude
that the mandatory information quality increases in case of a greater disaggregation. Fairfield et al.
(1996) and Hermann et al. (2000) focus on the income statement and on the link between earnings
disaggregation and analysts forecasts. Both affirm that a greater level of disaggregation improves
the accuracy of earnings forecasts. In a more recent study, Chen et al. (2015) construct a new
measure of disclosure quality, Disaggregation Quality (DQ), to capture the level of disaggregation
of accounting data in firms’ annual reports. They find that a greater level of disaggregation is
associated with lower forecast dispersion and higher forecast accuracy.
IPOs represent an interesting case for the analysis of the balance sheet disaggregation. They
enable entities to transform from a private company to a public company. The process of planning
and executing an IPO is time-intensive. It involves different players, e.g. advisory team, external
auditors, underwriters and other key advisors, and it has significant implications for the regulations
compliances. The prospectus is part of the registration process with SEC and constitutes a central
document for the communication to prospective investors. It contains disclosures about the
company’s business, results of operations, financial condition, management and other issues.62 The
61Reg S-X 5-02 requires SEC reporting entities to state separately balance sheet amounts that exceed certain
quantitative thresholds. Current assets, any other assets and each class of intangible assets exceeding 5% of total assets
must be presented separately. Entities must state separately the aggregate amount of notes receivable if it exceeds 10%
of total receivables. Finally, current liabilities and any other liabilities exceeding 5% of total liabilities must be
presented separately.
62 Specifically, the IPO prospectus contains the following sections: Summary, Risk factors, Industry and market data,
Use of proceeds, Capitalization, Financial data, MD&A of financial condition and results of operations, Business,
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SEC Form S-1 is the preliminary prospectus for a US company IPO.63 It is also known as the
registration statement under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. The final IPO prospectus, i.e.
Form 424, must be filed within two business days after pricing and contains also the final
information on pricing and underwriting. These forms specify the information, which must be
disclosed under Regulation S-X and Regulation S-K.
Hypothesis development
The purpose of this study is to assess whether some independent variables (e.g. listing year,
days between S-1 and 424 filings, industry type) affect the levels of disclosure (i.e. balance sheet
disaggregation), and to examine whether the extent of balance sheet disclosure has an impact on
the market (e.g. first-day returns).64
The disclosure of information in filings and prospectuses implies costs for the companies.
While firms must disclose part of the information to comply with regulations, often they voluntarily
provide additional disclosures. In case of voluntary disclosure, “it can reasonably be assumed that
the benefits of disclosure are perceived to exceed the costs” (Cooke, 1992). The first set of
hypotheses is to explore whether there are determinants for additional disclosures in the balance
sheet. Second, the paper tests the hypothesis that the further levels of disclosure affect first-day
returns.
In 2002, the US financial statement regulation has been significantly influenced by a great
reform: SOX. Its aim is to ensure the reliability of publicly reported financial information and
increase confidence in US capital markets. Given that all firms filing with SEC must comply with
Regulation S-X, which requires public companies to present comparative financial statements, the
disaggregation measures might not exhibit large year-to-year changes (Chen et al., 2015). With this
premise, the first hypothesis related to the additional disclosure determinants states:
H1a: Balance sheet disaggregation in final IPO prospectuses is not associated with the listing
year.
The number of calendar days between the S-1 filing and the filing of Form 424 on EDGAR
may be a determinant for a higher level of disaggregation in the final IPO prospectus. Loughran
Management, Executive compensation, Related-party transactions, Principal and selling shareholders, Underwriting
and Legal matters.
63 The other registration statements are Form S-3, Form S-4 and Form S-11. Generally, a company that already has
securities registered with the SEC fill Form S-3 for the registration of new securities. Form S-4 is generally used for
the registration of debt or equity securities issue connected to a merger or acquisition. Form S-11 may be used for the
registration of securities issued by certain real estate companies.
64 First-day return is the percentage change from the offer price to the closing price.
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and McDonald (2013) find a negative association between filings time distance and two variables
(i.e. upward revisions in the offer price and post-IPO return volatility).65 Additionally, the empirical
evidence of their analysis show that the greater the time distance between S-1 and 424 filings, the
less are the IPO first-day returns. Similarly, Arnold et al. (2010) find that more days in registration
imply lower first-day returns, and Hanley and Hoberg (2010) find that IPOs with more informative
content in Form S-1 have lower offer price revisions and first-day returns. Putting everything
together, it results that the IPO prospectus content may be more informative for those firms that
take more time to issue their stocks. Hence, a greater time distance between S-1 and 424 filings is
expected to imply a higher number of additional disclosures in the final IPO prospectus. Based
upon these arguments, the hypothesis to be tested is:
H1b: Balance sheet disaggregation in final IPO prospectuses is positively associated with
the number of days between S-1 and 424 filings.
Financial research suggests that the nature and extent of financial disclosure depends on the
industry(ies) in which a firm operates (e.g. Sprouse, 1967; Buzby 1975; Cerbioni and Menini,
2011). Concerning voluntary disclosure, Cormier and Magnan (1999) evidence suggests that also
industry type “contributes to explaining environmental disclosure”.66 Additionally, Hanley and
Hoberg (2010) find that most of the standardized content of IPO prospectuses is similar to that of
other IPOs operating in recent or similar industries. However, the directional effect of the industry
classification on the level of disclosure is not unique. Industries are not similar to each other. It is
reasonable to expect differences in the disclosure extent due to the distinct levels of regulations.
For example, Ferris et al. (2013) find that the business equipment and service industry displays the
greatest conservatism (i.e. the highest number of negative words in IPO prospectuses). The reason
is that firms in this industry are more likely to be involved in shareholders’ initiated litigation
(Francis et al., 1994). Given these premises, it is reasonable to suppose that higher levels of
regulations lead to a greater balance sheet information content. Therefore, the third hypothesis
concerning additional disclosures determinants states:
H1c: Balance sheet disaggregation in final IPO prospectuses depends on the industry type.
65 The offer price is the price proposed by the investment bank underwriting the securities issue to make them available
to the public. A security’s offering price includes the underwriter’s fee and any management fees applicable to the
issue.
66 Cormier and Magnan (1999) results suggest that key determinants of environmental disclosure are information costs
and a firm’s financial condition. Other determinants are firm size, the regulatory regime governing corporate
disclosure, and industry.
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The second hypothesis deals with the effect of financial disclosure on the market, in particular
on first-day returns. IPO prospectuses are the first documents through which companies willing to
quote on capital markets disclose business and financial information to the public. Hence, the
prospectuses’ content is critical for the success of the first shares sale. Some papers demonstrate
that there is an association between the prospectus content and first-day and subsequent IPO
returns. Analysing the tone of S-1 filings, Loughran and McDonald (2013) find that uncertain,
weak modal, and negative word frequencies are significantly related to both first-day returns and
post-IPO stock return volatility in a positive manner. Similarly, Arnold et al. (2010) develop some
measures of relative ambiguity and find that the degree of ambiguity has a positive impact on initial
and subsequent IPO returns. Using a conservatism measure, Ferris et al. (2013) find a link between
conservatism and post-IPO stock returns. Based on these empirical findings, it is reasonable to
expect that the higher the information content of balance sheet in IPO prospectuses, the lower are
first-day returns. Given these premises, the second hypothesis to be tested is:
H2: Balance sheet disaggregation in final IPO prospectuses is negatively associated with
first-day returns.
3.2 Sample, data collection and variable description
3.2.1 Sample selection and data collection
The initial sample is based on that of Brown et al. (2017). They collect all book-built US
IPOs completed between 2003 and 2012. Following some data selection criteria, their final sample
is of 696 IPOs. In line with this analysis purpose, the final prospectuses whose balance sheet does
not state separately current and noncurrent assets and/or liabilities are eliminated. This selection
results in a final sample of 683 IPOs.
Starting from Reg S-X requirements for the balance sheet presentation, a template balance
sheet (see Appendix 1) is prepared, where the line items required by Reg S-X 5-02 are in bold font
(e.g. Marketable securities; Property, Plant and Equipment; Deferred credits). These are considered
“generic” line items, because they represent the balance sheet minimum information content. The
additional disclosures are treated as “specific” line items and are marked by the italics font. The
balance sheet items ‘Accounts and notes receivable’ and ‘Accounts and notes payable’ follow the
disaggregation proposed by Reg S-X 5-02, they include four and seven specifications, respectively.
Instead the balance sheet item ‘Intangible assets’ is disaggregated into ‘Goodwill’ and ‘Other
Specifications’. It is not worth to further disaggregate the remaining balance sheet items; to them
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it is added a single specific line item denominated Specs to include all related specifications. For
the analysis purpose, each generic line item and the related specifications are referred to as
“category”.
The category ‘Redeemable preferred stock’ is excluded from the analysis, because it is a mix
of liabilities and shareholders’ equity. Finally, the ‘Shareholders’ equity’ section is excluded from
the analysis, because it is reasonable to expect no significant insights from this section.
The balance sheet or consolidated balance sheet in each final prospectus is classified
following the template balance sheet structure (Three data collection examples are available in
Appendix 2). For each generic and specific line item one is written if the balance sheet item is
disclosed in the IPO prospectus, otherwise zero. If there are more balance sheet items related to the
same generic or specific line item, those are summed. The total amount of the section and of the
generic and specific line items is calculated separately for each analysed subsection: Current Assets
(CA_TT; CA_GEN; CA_SPE); Noncurrent Assets (NA_TT; NA_GEN; NA_SPE); Current
Liabilities (CL_TT; CL_GEN; CL_SPE); Noncurrent Liabilities (NL_TT; NL_GEN; NL_SPE). In
addition, Total Assets (TA) and Total Liabilities (TL) are calculated and then divided into total
generic line items and total specific line items (i.e. TA_TT; TA_GEN; TA_SPE; TL_TT; TL_GEN;
TL_SPE). Appendix 3 summarizes the balance sheet variables and all other measures outlined
below.
3.2.2 Variable description
Three types of measures track the specific line items and their pervasiveness in the balance
sheet: (i) a measure for the number of balance sheet categories with specific line items (SPLI); (ii)
a ratio of the number of balance sheet categories with specific line items over the filled categories
(SPLIFC); (iii) a ratio of the number of balance sheet categories with specific line items over total
categories (SPLITC). Each measure is calculated for Current Assets (SPLI_CA; SPLIFC_CA;
SPLITC_CA), Noncurrent Assets (SPLI_NA; SPLIFC_NA; SPLITC_NA), Current Liabilities
(SPLI_CL; SPLIFC_CL; SPLITC_CL), Noncurrent Liabilities (SPLI_NL; SPLIFC_NL;
SPLITC_NL), and Total Assets and Liabilities (SPLI_TT; SPLIFC_TT; SPLITC_TT).
The indicator variable, SPLI, counts the number of categories containing at least a
specification. The variable equals to zero when no category includes a specification. SPLI_CA and
SPLI_NA can assume a value between zero and eight. The maximum value for SPLI_CL is two,
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while the range for SPLI_NL is zero-five. The variable SPLI_TT is the sum of the previous four
metrics.
The variable SPLIFC is the ratio (in terms of percentage value) between the number of
categories containing specific line items and the number of categories containing at least one
generic or specific line item. There is a metric for each balance sheet subsection, i.e. SPLIFC_CA,
SPLIFC_NA, SPLIFC_CL and SPLIFC_NL. The variable SPLIFC_TT’s numerator is the total
number of categories containing specific line items and its denominator is the total number of
categories containing at least one generic or specific line item.
Finally, the metric SPLITC captures the pervasiveness of specific line items on total balance
sheet categories. This variable returns a percentage value. It is the ratio between the number of
categories containing specific line items and the total categories. Each balance sheet section has its
own metric (SPLITC_CA, SPLITC_NA, SPLITC_CL and SPLITC_NL). The variable SPLITC_TT
measures the total number of categories containing specific line items over the total balance sheet
categories.
3.3 Descriptive evidence
The descriptive analysis of the balance sheet disaggregation is performed in relation to three
different variables: listing year, days between S-1 and 424 filings (DAYS), and industry
classification. The listing year is the year in which the company went public. The second variable
represents the number of calendar days between the initial filing date (S-1 filing) and 424 filing
date. The industry classification is based on the Fama-French 10 industry classification scheme.
Table 2 presents the sample distribution based on the listing year (2003-2012) and the industry
classification (Fama-French 10 industry). The descriptive analysis comprises summary statistics;
the calculation of the indicator variables (i.e. SPLI; SPLIFC; SPLITC); and t-test.
Listing year
The listing year is used to analyse the temporal change, and to compare IPOs before the
financial crisis (2003-2007) to those during and after the financial crisis (2008-2012).67 Table 3,
panel A and Figure 2 represent the mean of balance sheet items in the assets and liabilities
subsections over the sample period. Concerning Current Assets subsection, CA_TT and CA_SPE
show an increase in the mean value in the years 2008 and 2009, while the mean for CA_GEN is
67 All firms listed in 2007 are included in the pre-crisis subsample, even if the financial crisis started in US during the
2007 summer, because the number of IPOs from September 2007 to December 2007 is very small (i.e. 13 IPOs).
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quite constant over time. The peaks are evident also in the Noncurrent Assets subsection, mostly
for the generic and specific line items. In the Current Liabilities subsection, CL_TT and CL_SPE
show the same trend, which goes up and down over time, while CL_GEN is quite flat. The
Noncurrent Liabilities subsection shows a drop in 2008 (NL_TT and NL_GEN) and in 2009
(NL_SPE). After the changes in years 2008 and 2009, the mean in most subsections returns to the
initial values.
Table 3, panel B illustrates the temporal change of the indicator variables’ mean. Concerning
the first variable (i.e. SPLI), the evidence shows peaks in 2008 (SPLI_NA) and 2009 (SPLI_CA and
SPLI_NL), expect for SPLI_CL. Unlike the other four variables, the SPLI_TT trend varies going up
and down in the middle years, but at the end of sample period it returns to initial values. The results
of SPLIFC variable are slightly different. SPLIFC_CL and SPLIFC_TT have a flat trend. There is
a significant increase in 2008 for SPLIFC_NA and lower one in 2009 for SPLIFC_CA. Instead,
SPLIFC_NL shows a drop in 2009. Finally, the evidence related to SPLITC variable is also
different. SPLIFC_NL and SPLIFC_TT are quite stable over the sample period. SPLIFC_CLhas an
upward trend with a peak in 2009. SPLITC_CA and SPLIFC_NA show a little increase in 2009 and
in 2008, respectively.
The second part of the descriptive analysis related to the listing year concentrates on the
comparison of pre-crisis IPOs (2002-2007) with post-crisis IPOs (2008-2012). The IPOs listed
before the financial crisis are 437, while those listed during and after the financial crisis are 246.
Table 4, panel A presents separate summary statistics for pre- and post-crisis IPOs. The first
subsample discloses slightly more balance sheet items on average in each analysed subsection,
expect for NL_TT. The variation is greater in pre-crisis IPOs, except for CA_TT. The differences
in mean are not statistically significant, neither at 10% level. These results could suggest that the
financial crisis have not pushed firms to disclose more balance sheet items to attract potential
investors.
The statistics of the indicator variables are presented in Table 4, panel B. The results suggest
that even if pre-crisis IPOs disclose more line items in total, in their balance sheet there are less
specific line items (SPLI variable) than in the post-crisis subsample, except for SPLI_NL (see also
Panel C). The SPLIFC statistics show that there are slightly more filled categories in the post-crisis
IPOs including at least a specific line item. Concerning SPLITC variable, on average slightly more
assets and liabilities categories contains at least a specific line item in the post-crisis subsample
(except for SPLITC_NL). The differences in the mean values are statistically significant for most
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of the indicator variables related to liabilities, i.e. SPLI_CL, SPLI_NL, SPLIFC_NL, SPLITC_CL,
SPLITC_NL. It is also statistically significant the difference in mean for SPLIFC_CA. These results
could suggest that even if the total number of balance sheet items is almost unchanged in the two
subsamples, in the post-crisis period firms disclose more detailed information concerning their
liabilities.
Days between S-1 and 424 filings (DAYS)
The sample presents a large variation in the number of days between the S-1 and 424 filings
(Standard Deviation = 127). While on average firms are quoted after about 5 months (Mean =
153,9), the 5th percentile is 61 days compared to 416 days for IPOs at the 95th percentile. The
median (111 days) is used to divide the sample into two groups: fast and slow IPOs. Fast IPOs
subsample (N=350) includes the IPOs whose number of days separating the two filings is lower or
equal to 111; slow IPOs subsample (N=333) contains the IPOs, which take more time to file Form
424.
Table 5, panel A illustrates separate summary statistics of fast and slow IPOs for assets and
liabilities subsections, and panel C plots the mean of balance sheet items in IPO prospectuses. On
average, IPOs that take more time to list disclose slightly more balance sheet items for each
subsection. Slow IPOs have also a lower variation with respect to fast IPOs. However, the
differences in mean are statistically significant only for CA_TT and TA_TT, at 5% and 10% level
respectively. These results suggest that slow IPOs disclose more current assets items than fast IPOs.
The results of the indicator variables analysis are summarized in Table 5, panel B. The SPLI
values indicate a slightly greater disclosure of specific line items for slow IPOs. Instead the
variation in the two subsamples is very similar. The slow IPOs subsample presents a slightly higher
percentage of filled categories including at least a specific line item (SPLIFC), except for
SPLIFC_CL, and a slightly lower variation. Concerning the SPLITC variable, on average slightly
more assets and liabilities categories contains at least a specific line item in the slow IPOs
subsample. The variation is slightly lower for slow IPOs, except for SPLITC_CL. The differences
between the mean values are statistically significant for SPLI_CL, SPLI_TT, SPLIFC_TT,
SPLITC_CL, SPLITC_TT. These results suggest that firms taking more time to list disclose more
detailed information concerning their current liabilities.
Empirical evidence suggests that IPOs with a longer time distance disclose more information
in some balance sheet subsections than IPOs whose days between S-1 and 424 filings are lower
than the median value. The positive association between the balance sheet disaggregation in IPO
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prospectuses and DAYS variable may have two possible explanations. The first explanation is that
the time may have an impact on the disclosure level. In other words, the higher number of
registration days enable the companies to include more information in the final IPO prospectus, i.e.
more balance sheet items, than in Form S-1. On the contrary, the information included in the initial
prospectus may affect the time spent to file Form 424. The more items are included in S-1 filing,
the greater the questions or concerns raised by SEC. Therefore, management needs many days to
properly respond to SEC concerns about the IPO document.68 In this study, it is not possible to
disentangle the effect. However, to understand which could be the possible explanation, fifteen S-
1 filings are analysed to explore whether the balance sheet content differs from that of the
corresponding Form 424 (see Appendix 4). The evidence shows that the there is no significant
differences between fast and slow IPOs. Therefore, it is more plausible the second explanation: the
greater information content in Form S-1 implies higher DAYS.
Industry
The sample is clustered by the Fama-French 10 industry. Table 2 presents the sample
distribution based on this industry classification.  The IPOs are mostly concentrated in the
following industries: ‘Business Equipment’ (193) and ‘Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs’
(149). The second group in terms of number of IPOs per industry includes ‘Manufacturing’ (66);
‘Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services’ (64); ‘Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products’ (46).
The smallest industries in terms of IPOs are ‘Telephone and Television Transmission’ (22),
‘Utilities’ (18), ‘Consumer Nondurables’ (18) and ‘Consumer Durable’ (11). Finally, the industry
type ‘Other’ (Mines, Construction, Building, Transport, Hotels, Bus Service, Entertainment,
Finance) contains the remaining 96 IPOs.
Table 6, panel A illustrates separate summary statistics related to assets and liabilities
subsections per industry. The results present a meaningful variation in the mean values across the
industries. The industry ‘Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products’ (hereinafter, OCG) stands
out, because it shows the greatest mean values. There are two exceptions, CA_TT and TA_TT, but
the values of these balance sheet variables are anyway high compared to those of the other
industries (second and third greatest values among all industries, respectively). The industry
‘Consumer Durables’ dominates in the balance sheet variables CA_TT and TA_TT, and present the
68 Both Arnold et al. (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2013) affirm that the number of calendar days between S-
1 and 424 filings is also an investment risk signal to investors. The delay in issuing stock is likely due to questions or
concerns raised by SEC that “have not been fully addressed in the prospectus implying that the issue may be riskier”
(Arnold et al., 2010).
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second highest values in NA_TT and TL_TT. The lowest values are mainly associated to the
industry ‘Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs’, except for CL_TT.
The results related to the indicator variables are less straightforward (Table 6, panel B).
However, the greatest values are concentrated in two industries. First, the OCG industry dominates
in eight out of fifteen indicator variables. In second place there is the industry ‘Consumer Durables’
with four indicator variables. The industry ‘Wholesale, Retail and Some services’ outperforms the
other industry types in SPLIFC_NL. The smallest values instead are more scattered among the
industries ‘Business Equipment’; ‘Consumer Nondurables’; ‘Healthcare, Medical Equipment and
Drugs’; ‘Utilities’.
The empirical findings show that the extent of balance sheet disclosure depends on the
industry in which a firm operates. The OCG industry displays mostly the greatest values in both
balance sheet variables and indicator variables. The firms in this industry are generally subject to
high levels of disclosure requirements.69 Hence, the higher the levels of regulations, the greater is
the balance sheet information content. Untabulated results concerning the differences in means
support this reasoning: the differences are statistically significant for all balance sheet variables,
expect for CL_TT. Concerning the eight indicator variables where OCG dominates in terms of
mean, t-test shows that these differences are also statistically significant. The other industry
presenting great values is ‘Consumer Durables’. This industry is a great contributor to the US
economy. This can explain the greater extent of disclosure in balance sheets of firms operating in
‘Consumer Durables’ industry. The differences in mean related to this industry are also significant
for all balance sheet variables, expect for CL_TT. Regarding the indicator variables in which CD
has the highest means, only in two of them this is difference is statistically significant (i.e. SPLI_NA
and SPLITC_NA).
3.4 Empirical Analysis
The goal of this study is to determine whether financial disclosure in the balance sheets of
final IPOs prospectuses affects first-day returns (hereinafter, FDRs). To investigate how the
balance sheet content affects FDRs (H2), it is used the regression analysis where the dependent
variable is FDRs. The control variables introduced in all models are ASSETS, DAYS, listing year
69 In The McLaughlin-Sherouse List - The 10 Most-Regulated Industries of 2014, ‘Petroleum and coal products
manufacturing’ and ‘Oil and gas extraction’ are the first and the eighth industries, respectively. The article is available
at: https://www.mercatus.org/publication/mclaughlin-sherouse-list-10-most-regulated-industries-2014.
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and industry. ASSETS is the variable used by Brown et al. (2017) to represent total assets as of the
prior fiscal period-end as gathered from the final prospectus. DAYS is the number of calendar days
between the initial filing date (S-1 filing) and 424 filing date. The year fixed effects and the industry
cluster by Fama-French-10 industry are included in each model. Because of some missing data in
the control variables, the number of IPOs analysed in the regression models resolves into 668,
instead of 683.
The regression analysis is performed using both balance sheet variables and indicator
variables as independent variables. First, it is investigated whether the assets and liabilities
subsections content have effects on FDRs. Second, the paper analyses the impact of assets and
liabilities line items disaggregated into generic and specific. Third, it is investigated whether the
indicator variables SPLI_TT, SPLIFC_TT and SPLITC_TT affect the FDRs. Finally, those variables
disaggregated according to the subsections are used to analyse their effect on FDRs.
Balance sheet variables and first-day returns
The analysis begins with the examination of assets and liabilities line items effects and
proceeds with the investigation of generic and specific line items impact. Table 7 reports the results
of the assets and liabilities subsections content effects. In model 1, the financial disclosure is
represented by the variables TA_TT and TL_TT, which indicate the total number of line items in
the assets and liabilities sections, respectively. In model 2, the assets and liabilities information is
disaggregated into current and noncurrent (CA_TT and NA_TT; CL_TT and NL_TT). Both analyses
are helpful in assessing whether the content of the balance sheet influence the investors’ valuation
of the IPOs.
 In model 1, the coefficient on TA_TT is small and negative, but significant at 10% level (-
0.004; robust standard error = -0.002), while the coefficient on TL_TT is positive and not significant
(0.002; robust standard error = -0.003). The results of model 2 are consistent with those of model
1. Both CL_TT and NL_TT coefficients are not statistically significant. Concerning the assets side,
only NA_TT has a negative effect that is statistically significant at 1% level (coefficient = -0.009,
robust standard error = -0.003).
Table 8 focuses on the distinction between generic and specific line items. The label ‘generic’
refers to the line items required by Reg S-X 5-02 for the balance sheet presentation, while the
specific line items represent the additional disclosures provided by the companies. In model 1, the
balance sheet content is represented by the GENERIC and SPECIFIC variables. Models 2 to 5
include the generic and specific variables for each subsection: Current Assets (model 2),
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Noncurrent Assets (model 3), Current Liabilities (model 4), and Noncurrent Liabilities (model 5).
Finally, model 6 includes all specific and generic line items variables divided by subsection
(CA_GEN, CA_SPE, NA_GEN, NA_SPE, CL_GEN, CL_SPE, NL_GEN and NL_SPE).
In model 1, the coefficients of GENERIC and SPECIFIC are both negative and small, but not
significant (GENERIC: coefficient = -0.001; robust standard error = 0.004; SPECIFIC: coefficient
= -0.001; robust standard error = 0.001). Consistently with table 7, the coefficients in models 2, 4
and 5 are not significant. Concerning Noncurrent Assets (model 3), the coefficient on NA_GEN is
negative and not significant (0.013; robust standard error = 0.008), while the NA_SPE has a
negative effect on FDRs that is statistically significant at 5% level (coefficient = -0.006; robust
standard error = 0.003). However, putting all assets and liabilities subsections together (model 6),
neither variable is statistically significant.
 The results across all models involving the balance sheet variables indicate that only the asset
side negatively affects the initial returns with Noncurrent Assets disclosure. Therefore, the higher
the number of line items in NA subsection, the lower are the first-day returns. After disaggregating
NA into generic and specific line items, it appears that only NA_SPE is statistically significant.
However, all marginal effects on FDRs are very small.
Indicator variables and first-day returns
To further investigate the role of specific line items in the balance sheets of final IPO
prospectuses, three indicator variables is developed (i.e. SPLI, SPLIFC and SPLITC). SPLI
measures the number of balance sheet categories with specific line items. The other two indicator
variables are ratios of the number of balance sheet categories with specific line items over the filled
categories (SPLIFC) and over total categories (SPLITC) respectively. These variables are used in
the regression analysis to assess whether additional disclosures may affect the FDRs.
Table 9 presents the four regression models of the indicator variables on first-day returns.
The first three models analyse the effect of SPLI_TT (model 1), SPLIFC_TT (model 2) and
SPLITC_TT (model 3) separately, while model 4 puts together these three indicator variables. None
of the indicator variables has a statistically significant effect on FDRs. In addition, the variables
have not the same directional effect in models 1 to 3 compared with the coefficients of model 4.
 Table 10 presents the results for regressions that consider the indicator variables calculated
for each balance sheet subsection. Model 1 includes the variables SPLI_CA, SPLI_NA, SPLI_CL
and SPLI_NL; model 2 includes the variables SPLIFC_CA, SPLIFC_NA, SPLIFC_CL and
SPLIFC_NL; model 3 includes the variables SPLITC_CA, SPLITC_NA, SPLITC_CL and
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SPLITC_NL. Most of the results are not statistically significant, expect for SPLI_NL and
SPLITC_NL. The coefficient on SPLI_NL is positive and significant at 10% level (0.021; robust
standard error = 0.011), and SPLITC_NL has a positive effect that is statistically significant at 10%
level (coefficient = 0.107; robust standard error = 0.056).
 The results across all models involving the indicator variables indicate that they do not have
a strong predictive power. Only two variables related to liabilities affect first-day returns in a
positive way. In other words, an additional specific line item in the Noncurrent Liabilities
subsection increases the initial IPO returns. Hence, an additional piece of information related to
liabilities increases the investors’ valuation of the firms.
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4. Conclusions
Corporate disclosure is essential in capital markets. Besides disclosure regulatory
requirements, companies can engage in voluntary communication. The balance sheet is one of the
critical financial statements prescribed by the regulations. The rules require a minimum
information content that firms can voluntarily enlarge. In particular, companies undertaking an IPO
are likely to disclose additional information in IPO prospectuses. Indeed, Form S-1 and Form 424
are the first financial documents revealed to the public. The paper analysis is based on the sample
of Brown et al. (2017), which includes the IPOs completed between 2003 and 2012. Each final IPO
prospectus is classified following the rules provided by the Reg S-X 5-02. The balance sheet items
are divided into generic and specific to distinguish the minimum content from the additional
disclosures. In addition, some indicator variables are calculate to track the specific line items and
their pervasiveness in the balance sheet (i.e. SPLI; SPLIFC; SPLITC).
The first evidence shows that the financial crisis had an impact on the number of line items
disclosed: the level of balance sheet disclosure undergoes increases or decreases in correspondence
of years 2008 and 2009. When comparing pre-crisis IPOs to post-crisis IPOs, it emerges that even
if the total number of balance sheet items is almost unchanged in the two subsamples, in the post-
crisis period firms disclose more detailed information concerning their liabilities. Analysing the
fast and slow IPOs, empirical evidence suggests that firms taking more time to list present a greater
level of detailed information concerning their current liabilities. Finally, in the analysis based on
the industry classification, the ‘Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products’ industry mostly
displays the greatest values in both balance sheet variables and indicator variables.
The insights from the regression analyses are that, among the balance sheet variables, only
Noncurrent Assets affects first-day returns in a negative manner. Hence, the greater the number of
line items in this subsection, the lower are FDRs. Concerning the regression models involving the
indicator variables, empirical evidence suggests that they do not have a strong predictive power.
Only SPLI_NL and SPLIFC_NL positively influence FDRs. Summarizing, an additional
information regarding Noncurrent Assets reduces the difference between investors’ evaluation and
the offer price, i.e. FDRs. On the opposite, one more line item in the Noncurrent Liabilities
subsection increases this gap, i.e. FDRs increase. Hence, investors assign a greater value to
information on liabilities than to assets disclosures.
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Appendix 1
Template balance sheet
XXX Corp
Balance sheet
December 31, 20X6 and 20X5
Assets
December 31,
20X6
December 31,
20X5
(in million $) (in million $)
Current assets
5-02.1: Cash and cash items xxx xxx
CategorySpecs xxx xxx
5-02.2: Marketable securities xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.3: Accounts and notes receivable xxx xxx
1. Customers (trade) xxx xxx
2. Related parties xxx xxx
3. Underwriters, promoters, and employees
(other than related parties); xxx xxx
4. Others xxx xxx
5-02.4: Allowances for doubtful accounts and
notes receivable xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.5: Unearned income xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.6: Inventories xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.7: Prepaid expenses xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.8: Other current assets xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.9: Total current assets (CA_TT) xxx xxx
CA_GEN xxx xxx
CA_SPE xxx xxx
5-02.10: Securities of related parties xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.11: Indebtedness of related parties xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.12: Other investments xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.13: Property, plant and equipment xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
Assets
December 31,
20X6
December 31,
20X5
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(in million $) (in million $)
5-02.14: Accumulated depreciation, depletion,
and amortization of property, plant and
equipment
xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.15: Intangible assets xxx xxx
1. Goodwill xxx xxx
2. Other Specs xxx xxx
5-02.16: Accumulated depreciation and
amortization of intangible assets xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.17: Other assets xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
Total noncurrent assets (NA_TT) xxx xxx
NA_GEN xxx xxx
NA_SPE xxx xxx
5-02.18: Total assets (TA_TT) xxx xxx
TA_GEN xxx xxx
TA_SPE xxx xxx
Liabilities
December 31,
20X6
December 31,
20X5
(in million $) (in million $)
Current liabilities
5-02.19: Accounts and notes payable xxx xxx
(1) banks for borrowings; xxx xxx
(2) factors or other financial institutions for
borrowings; xxx xxx
(3) holders of commercial paper; xxx xxx
(4) trade creditors; xxx xxx
(5) related parties; xxx xxx
(6) underwriters, promoters, and employees
(other than related parties); xxx xxx
(7) others. xxx xxx
5-02.20: Other current liabilities xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02,21 Total current liabilities (CL_TT) xxx xxx
CL_GEN xxx xxx
CL_SPE xxx xxx
5-02.22: Bonds, mortgages and other long-term
debt including capitalized leases xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.23: Indebtedness to related parties—
noncurrent xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
66
Notes: Appendix 1 represents the template balance sheet used as basis to classify the balance sheet items in final IPO prospectuses.
The line items required by Reg S-X 5-02 are considered “generic” items and are in bold font. The additional disclosures are treated
as “specific” line items and are marked by the italics font. The balance sheet items ‘Accounts and notes receivable’ and ‘Accounts
and notes payable’ follow the disaggregation proposed by Reg S-X 5-02. ‘Intangible assets’ is disaggregated in ‘Goodwill’ and
‘Other Specifications’. The remaining items have only one specific line item denominated Specs. For the analysis purpose, each
generic line item and the related specifications are referred to as “category”.
Liabilities
December 31,
20X6
December 31,
20X5
(in million $) (in million $)
5-02.24: Other liabilities xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.25: Commitments and contingent
liabilities xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
5-02.26: Deferred credits xxx xxx
Specs xxx xxx
Total noncurrent liabilities (NL_TT) xxx xxx
NL_GEN xxx xxx
NL_SPE xxx xxx
Total liabilities (TL_TT) xxx xxx
TL_GEN xxx xxx
TL_SPE xxx xxx
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Appendix 2
Examples of balance sheet items classification
The balance sheet items’ classification is clarified using three examples. The examples are selected
according to the level of disclosure content: low (ID n. 1207), medium (ID n. 1162), high (ID n.
1621). For each example, there are two tables. In the first table, it is reproduced the balance sheet
in the IPO prospectus and for each line item it is assigned a category following Appendix 1. The
second table reports the balance sheet content following the template balance sheet in Appendix 1.
ID n. 1207
Balance sheet (IPO prospectus)
December 31,
2002
December 31,
2003 Assigned category
ASSETS (in thousand $) (in thousand $)
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents 779 246 Cash and Cash items
Short-term investments 161 1,491 Marketable securities
Other current assets 10 30 Other current assets
Total current assets 950 1,767
Property and equipment, net 57 74 Property, plant and equipment
Other non-current assets — —
Total assets 1,007 1,841
LIABILITIES
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable 10 74 Accounts and notes payable
Accrued liabilities 27 84 Accounts and notes payable,
(4) trade creditors
Total current liabilities 37 158
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ID n. 1207
‘Classified’ Balance sheet
ASSETS
Line items
(number)
Cash and Cash items  1
Marketable securities 1
Other current assets 1
CA_TT 3
CA_GEN 3
CA_SPE 0
Property, plant and equipment 1
NA_TT 1
NA_GEN 1
NA_SPE 0
TA_TT 4
TA_GEN 4
TA_SPE 0
LIABILITIES
Line items
(number)
Accounts and notes payable 1
(4) trade creditors 1
CL_TT 2
CL_GEN 1
CL_SPE 1
NL_TT 0
NL_GEN 0
NL_SPE 0
TL_TT 2
TL_GEN 1
TL_SPE 1
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ID n. 1162
Balance sheet (IPO prospectus)
December 29,
2002
December 28,
2003 Assigned category
ASSETS (in thousand $) (in thousand $)
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents 22,596 42,852 Cash and cash items
Accounts receivable, net of reserves of
$3,764 in 2002 and $3,869 in 2003
57,497 64,571 Accounts and notes receivable (1);
Allowances for doubtful accounts and
notes receivable (1)
Inventories 21,832 19,480 Inventories
Notes receivable, net of reserves of
$1,785 in 2002 and $291 in 2003
3,398 3,785 Accounts and notes receivable (1);
Allowances for doubtful accounts and
notes receivable (1)
Prepaid expenses and other 6,694 16,040 Other current assets
Advertising fund assets, restricted 28,231 30,544 Other current assets; Specs
Deferred income taxes 6,809 5,730 Other current assets; Specs
Total current assets 147,057 183,002
Property, plant and equipment:
Land and buildings 15,986 21,849 Property, plant and equipment; Specs
Leasehold and other improvements 57,029 61,433 Property, plant and equipment; Specs
Equipment 145,513 158,286 Property, plant and equipment; Specs
Construction in progress 5,727 6,133 Property, plant and equipment; Specs
Accumulated depreciation and
amortization
103,708 120,634 Accumulated depreciation, depletion,
and amortization of property, plant and
equipment
Property, plant and equipment, net 120,547 127,067 Property, plant and equipment
Other assets:
Investments in marketable securities,
restricted
3,172 4,155 Other investments
Notes receivable, less current portion,
net of reserves of $1,899 in 2002 and
$1,840 in 2003
10,755 1,813 Other current assets; Specs (2)
Deferred financing costs, net of
accumulated amortization of $22,436
in 2002 and $846 in 2003
18,264 18,847 Intangible assets, Specs (1);
Accumulated depreciation and
amortization of intangible assets, Specs
(1)
Goodwill 23,232 23,432 Intangible assets, Goodwill
Capitalized software, net of
accumulated amortization of $25,930
in 2002 and $26,936 in 2003
28,313 27,197 Intangible assets, Specs (1);
Accumulated depreciation and
amortization of intangible assets, Specs
(1)
Other assets, net of accumulated
amortization of $1,374 in 2002 and
$2,087 in 2003
10,945 11,020 Intangible assets, Specs (1);
Accumulated depreciation and
amortization of intangible assets, Specs
(1)
Deferred income taxes 60,390 52,042 Other assets, Specs
Total other assets 155,071 138,506
Total assets 422,675 448,575
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December 29,
2002
December 28,
2003 Assigned category
LIABILITIES (in thousand $) (in thousand $)
Current liabilities:
Current portion of long-term debt 2,843 18,572 Accounts and notes payable, (1) banks
for borrowings
Accounts payable 46,131 53,388 Accounts and notes payable
Accrued compensation 26,723 25,315 Accounts and notes payable; (6)
underwriters, promoters, and
employees (other than related parties);
Accrued interest 12,864 17,217 Accounts and notes payable; (4) trade
creditors
Insurance reserves 8,452 9,432 Other current liabilities; Specs
Advertising fund liabilities 28,231 30,544 Other current liabilities; Specs
Other accrued liabilities 32,006 29,795 Accounts and notes payable; 7. others
Total current liabilities 157,250 184,263
Long-term liabilities:
Long-term debt, less current portion 599,180 941,165 Bonds, mortgages and other long-term
debt including capitalized leases
Insurance reserves 12,510 15,941 Other liabilities; Specs
Other accrued liabilities 29,090 25,169 Other liabilities; Specs
Total long-term liabilities 640,780 982,275
Total liabilities 798,030 1166,538
ID n. 1162
‘Classified’ Balance sheet
ASSETS
Line items
(number)
Current assets:
Cash and cash items 1
Accounts and notes receivable 2
Allowances for doubtful accounts and
notes receivable
2
Inventories 1
Other current assets 1
Specs 2
CA_TT 9
CA_GEN 7
CA_SPE 2
Other investments 1
Property, plant and equipment 1
Specs 4
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 Line items
(number)
Accumulated depreciation, depletion,
and amortization of property, plant and
equipment
1
Intangible assets: Goodwill 1
Intangible assets: Specs 3
Accumulated depreciation and
amortization of intangible assets: Specs
3
Other assets: Specs 3
NA_TT 17
NA_GEN 3
NA_SPE 14
TA_TT 26
TA_GEN 10
TA_SPE 16
LIABILITIES
Line items
(number)
Accounts and notes payable 1
(1) banks for borrowings 1
(4) trade creditors 1
(6) underwriters, promoters, and
employees (other than related
parties);
1
(7) others 1
Other current liabilities: Specs 2
CL_TT 7
CL_GEN 1
CL_SPE 6
Bonds, mortgages and other long-term
debt including capitalized leases
1
Other liabilities: Specs 2
NL_TT 3
NL_GEN 1
NL_SPE 2
TL_TT 10
TL_GEN 2
TL_SPE 8
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ID n. 1621
Balance sheet (IPO prospectus)
December 31,
2007
December 31,
2008 Assigned category
ASSETS (in thousand $) (in thousand $)
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents 7,351 56,483 Cash and cash items
Restricted cash — 666 Cash and cash items, Specs
Accounts receivable, net of allowance
for doubtful accounts of $6,016 and
$18,246
14,630 28,946 Accounts and notes receivable (1);
Allowances for doubtful accounts and
notes receivable (1)
Inventories 194 288 Inventories
Loans receivable 277 — Accounts and notes receivable, (1)
banks for borrowings
Current portion of deferred income
taxes
— 2,734 Other current assets, Specs
Prepaid expenses and other current
assets
561 6,773 Other current assets
Total current assets 23,013 95,890
Property and equipment, net 13,240 27,715 Property, plant and equipment
Goodwill 76 76 Intangible assets, Goodwill
Intangibles 1,821 1,821 Intangible assets
Deferred income taxes — 2,366 Other assets, Specs
Other long term assets 907 1,378 Other assets
Total assets 39,057 129,246
LIABILITIES
Current liabilities:
Accounts payable 2,721 4,705 Accounts and notes payable
Accrued liabilities 6,036 16,543 Accounts and notes payable, (4) trade
creditors;
Deferred revenue 16,817 67,425 Accounts and notes payable, (4) trade
creditors;
Other liabilities 75 40 Other current liabilities
Current portion of leases payable 133 142 Accounts and notes payable, (3)
holders of commercial paper
Current maturities of notes payable 1,580 74 Accounts and notes payable
U.S. Governmental refundable loan
funds
221 — Other current liabilities, Specs
Total current liabilities 27,583 88,929
Leases payable, less current maturities 415 308 Bonds, mortgages and other long-term
debt including capitalized leases
Notes payable, less current portion 3,545 160 Deferred credits, Specs
Deferred tax liability 556 — Other liabilities, Specs
Other long term liabilities — 2,740 Other liabilities
Rent liability 2,045 3,938 Other liabilities, Specs
Total liabilities 34,144 96,075
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ID n. 1621
‘Classified’ Balance sheet
ASSETS
Line items
(number)
Current assets:
Cash and cash items 1
Specs 1
Accounts and notes receivable 1
(1) banks for borrowings 1
Allowances for doubtful accounts and
notes receivable
1
Inventories 1
Other current assets 1
Specs 1
CA_TT 8
CA_GEN 5
CA_SPE 3
Property, plant and equipment 1
Intangible assets 1
Goodwill 1
Other assets 1
Specs 1
NA_TT 5
NA_GEN 3
NA_SPE 2
TA_TT 13
TA_GEN 8
TA_SPE 5
LIABILITIES
Line items
(number)
Accounts and notes payable 2
(3) holders of commercial paper; 1
(4) trade creditors; 1
(7) others. 1
Other current liabilities 1
Specs 1
CL_TT 7
CL_GEN 3
CL_SPE 4
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 Line items
(number)
Bonds, mortgages and other long-term
debt including capitalized leases
1
Other liabilities 1
Specs 2
Deferred credits: Specs 1
NL_TT 5
NL_GEN 2
NL_SPE 3
TL_TT 12
TL_GEN 5
TL_SPE 7
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Appendix 3
Variable description
Balance sheet variables
CA_TT Total line items of Current Assets.
CA_GEN Total generic line items of Current Assets.
CA_SPE Total specific line items of Current Assets.
NA_TT Total line items of Noncurrent Assets.
NA_GEN Total generic line items of Noncurrent Assets.
NA_SPE Total specific line items of Noncurrent Assets
TA_TT Total line items of Total Assets.
TA_GEN Total generic line items of Total Assets.
TA_SPE Total specific line items of Total Assets.
CL_TT Total line items of Current Liabilities.
CL_GEN Total generic line items of Current Liabilities.
CL_SPE Total specific line items of Current Liabilities.
NL_TT Total line items of Noncurrent Liabilities.
NL_GEN Total generic line items of Noncurrent Liabilities.
NL_SPE Total specific line items of Noncurrent Liabilities.
TL_TT Total line items of Total Liabilities.
TL_GEN Total generic line items of Total Liabilities.
TL_SPE Total specific line items of Total Liabilities.
GENERIC Total generic line items in assets and liabilities sections.
SPECIFIC Total specific line items in assets and liabilities sections.
Indicator variables
SPLI_CA The number of Current Assets categories with specific line items.
SPLI_NA The number of Noncurrent Assets categories with specific line items.
SPLI_CL The number of Current Liabilities categories with specific line items.
SPLI_NL The number of Noncurrent Liabilities categories with specific line items.
SPLI_TT The number of Total Assets and Total Liabilities categories with specific line
items.
SPLIFC_CA The ratio between the number of Current Assets categories containing specific
line items and all Current Assets filled categories. It is measured as percentage
value.
SPLIFC_NA The ratio between the number of Noncurrent Assets categories containing
specific line items and all Noncurrent Assets filled categories. It is measured
as percentage value.
SPLIFC_CL The ratio between the number of Current Liabilities categories containing
specific line items and all Current Liabilities filled categories. It is measured
as percentage value.
SPLIFC_NL The ratio between the number of Noncurrent Liabilities categories containing
specific line items and all Noncurrent Liabilities filled categories. It is
measured as percentage value.
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SPLIFC_TT The ratio between Total Assets and Total Liabilities categories containing
specific line items and all Total Assets and Total Liabilities filled categories.
It is measured as percentage value.
SPLITC_CA The ratio between the number of Current Assets categories containing specific
line items and all Current Assets categories. It is measured as percentage
value.
SPLITC_NA The ratio between the number of Noncurrent Assets categories containing
specific line items and all Noncurrent Assets categories. It is measured as
percentage value.
SPLITC_CL The ratio between the number of Current Liabilities categories containing
specific line items and all Current Liabilities categories. It is measured as
percentage value.
SPLITC_NL The ratio between the number of Noncurrent Liabilities categories containing
specific line items and all Noncurrent Liabilities categories. It is measured as
percentage value.
SPLITC_TT The ratio between Total Assets and Total Liabilities categories containing
specific line items and all Total Assets and Total Liabilities categories. It is
measured as percentage value.
Control variables
DAYS The number of calendar days between the filing of the initial IPO prospectus
on SEC EDGAR (Form S-1) and the final prospectus (Form 424).
ASSETS Total assets as of the prior fiscal period-end as gathered from the final
prospectus.
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Appendix 4
Form S-1 and Form 424 comparison: a 15 filings subsample
The fifteen Form S-1 are selected according to the following criteria:
- 5 filings among the IPOs with the lowest number of DAYS (Fast IPOs);
- 5 filings among the IPOs around median DAYS (Median IPOs);
- 5 filings among the IPOs with the highest number of DAYS (Slow IPOs).
The analysis results are summarized in tabular format. In both ‘fast IPOs’ and ‘median IPOs’
groups, three out of five firms have added in total a line item in their final IPO prospectus with
respect to Form S-1. Concerning the ‘slow IPOs’ group, one firm has added a line item, another
one has decreased the total number of line items by one unit, and the remaining firms have not
changed their balance sheet content compared to the preliminary prospectus.
ID Differences(YES or NO) Difference type and sign
CA NA CL NL TT
Fast
IPOs
1063 YES +1 +1
1180 NO 0
1191 NO 0
1221 YES +1 +1
1583 YES +1 +1
Median
IPOs
1127 NO 0
1410 NO 0
1556 YES +1 +1
1707 YES +1 +1 -1 +1
1718 YES +1 +1
Slow
IPOs
1074 YES -1 -1 +1 -1
1120 NO 0
1547 NO 0
1599 NO 0
1620 YES +1 +1
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Figure 1
The jurisdictions requiring IFRS standards for domestic public companies
Notes: This figure presents the 126 jurisdictions, which require IFRS standards for all or most domestic publicly accountable entities, including listed companies
and financial institutions, in their capital markets.
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Figure 2
Assets and liabilities sections’ items per year
Notes: This figure presents the temporal change of balance sheet items mean in the assets and liabilities sections. For each subsection it is depicted the trend over the
sample period (2003-2012) using total section, total generic line items and total specific line items. All variables are defined in Appendix 3.
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Table 1
Financial Reporting in the United States and in the European Union: main developments
Year
Panel A: United States
1933 Securities Act
1934 Securities Exchange Act
2000 Regulation Fair Disclosure
2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Panel B: European Union
1978 Fourth Directive (annual accounts of companies with limited liability)
1983 Seventh Directive (consolidated accounts of companies with limited liability)
2001 Fair Value Directive (requiring/allowing for fair value measurement of specific balance sheet items)
2002 IAS Regulation (application of IFRS from 2005 onwards)
2003 Modernization Directive (reflecting IFRS developments in the Fourth and Seventh Directive)
2004 Transparency Directive (TD)
2005 IFRS mandatory for listed companies in European Union
2008 Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 (adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002)
Jun 2013 Accounting Directive
Oct 2013 Transparency Directive Amending Directive (TDAD)
Notes: This table presents the main developments of financial reporting regulations in the United States and in the European Union.
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Table 2
Year and industry distribution in full sample
Number of firms Number Percent
Listing year 2003 36 5.27%
2004 107 15.67%
2005 86 12.59%
2006 102 14.93%
2007 106 15.52%
2008 14 2.05%
2009 27 3.95%
2010 59 8.64%
2011 62 9.08%
2012 84 12.30%
Industry Business Equipment 193 28.26%
Consumer Durables 11 1.61%
Consumer Nondurables 18 2.64%
Healthcare, Medical Equipment and Drugs 149 21.82%
Manufacturing 66 9.66%
Oil, Gas and Coal extraction and products 46 6.73%
Other 96 14.06%
Telephone and Television Transmission 22 3.22%
Utilities 18 2.64%
Wholesale, Retail and Some services 64 9.37%
Notes: This table represents the sample distribution based on the listing year (2003-2012) and industry classification (Fama-French 10 industry). The total sample
consist of 683 US IPOs completed from 2003 to 2012.
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Table 3
Summary statistics and indicator variables of IPOs per year
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Panel A: Summary statistics (Mean)
CA_TT (18) 5.47 5.51 5.78 5.99 5.62 6.21 6.63 5.53 5.39 5.38
CA_GEN (8) 4.28 4.21 4.30 4.22 4.23 3.93 4.19 4.05 3.92 4.00
CA_SPE (10) 1.19 1.31  1.48 1.77 1.40 2.29 2.44 1.47 1.47 1.38
NA_TT (17) 4.97 4.66 5.03 4.85 4.44 5.14 5.26 4.78 4.79 4.14
NA_GEN (8) 2.33 2.48 2.65 2.50 2.56 2.36 3.33 2.85 2.63 2.46
NA_SPE (9) 2.64 2.19 2.38 2.35 1.89 2.79 1.93 1.93 2.16 1.68
TA_TT (35) 10.44 10.18 10.81 10.84 10.07 11.36 11.89 10.31 10.18 9.52
TA_GEN (16) 6.61 6.68 6.95 6.72 6.78 6.29 7.52 6.90 6.55 6.46
TA_SPE (19) 3.83 3.50 3.86 4.13 3.28 5.07 4.37 3.41 3.63 3.06
CL_TT (10) 5.36 5.10 5.80 5.35 5.53 5.07 5.70 5.10 5.11 4.95
CL_GEN (2) 1.28 1.21 1.24 1.23 1.29 1.07 1.04 1.19 1.31 1.18
CL_SPE (8) 4.08 3.89 4.56 4.13 4.24 4.00 4.67 3.92 3.81 3.77
NL_TT (10) 3.03 2.86 3.28 3.38 3.11 2.57 3.07 3.15 3.21 3.27
NL_GEN (5) 1.56 1.53 1.67 1.75 1.65 1.36 2.04 2.02 1.92 1.77
NL_SPE (5) 1.47 1.33 1.60 1.64 1.46 1.21 1.04 1.14 1.29 1.50
TL_TT (20) 8.39 7.96 9.08 8.74 8.64 7.64 8.78 8.25 8.32 8.23
TL_GEN (7) 2.83 2.75 2.92 2.97 2.94 2.43 3.07 3.20 3.23 2.95
TL_SPE (13) 5.56 5.21 6.16 5.76 5.70 5.21 5.70 5.05 5.10 5.27
83
Table 3, continued from previous page
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Panel B: Indicator variables
SPLI
SPLI_CA (8) 0.97 1.11 1.25 1.38 1.15 1.43 1.81 1.29 1.13 1.12
SPLI_NA (8) 1.36 1.38 1.50 1.44 1.22 1.86 1.59 1.34 1.42 1.20
SPLI_CL (2) 1.17 1.27 1.33 1.29 1.39 1.36 1.56 1.31 1.46 1.39
SPLI_NL (5) 0.97 0.93 0.96 1.05 0.95 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.83 0.93
SPLI_TT (23) 4.47 4.69 5.02 5.17 4.71 5.36 5.67 4.66 4.85 4.65
SPLIFC
SPLIFC_CA 20.32% 25.71% 28.07% 30.07% 26.28% 32.26% 41.73% 29.86% 29.71% 27.30%
SPLIFC_NA 41.57% 43.13% 45.47% 46.09% 40.38% 62.26% 49.01% 42.94% 47.76% 41.71%
SPLIFC_CL 88.89% 93.46% 93.81% 93.63% 93.40% 92.86% 98.15% 94.07% 93.27% 95.95%
SPLIFC_NL 44.44% 50.16% 46.70% 46.57% 45.28% 44.05% 31.79% 36.58% 41.99% 48.09%
SPLIFC_TT 40.19% 43.89% 44.75% 45.57% 43.16% 50.55% 49.19% 42.81% 45.32% 45.17%
SPLITC 12.15% 13.90% 15.58% 17.28% 14.39% 17.86% 22.69% 16.10% 14.18% 14.02%
SPLITC_CA 17.01% 17.29% 18.80% 18.01% 15.21% 23.21% 19.91% 16.74% 17.79% 15.03%
SPLITC_NA 58.33% 63.55% 66.64% 64.71% 69.34% 67.86% 77.78% 65.25% 73.08% 69.59%
SPLITC_CL 19.44% 18.50% 19.23% 20.98% 19.06% 14.29% 14.07% 14.58% 16.54% 18.65%
SPLITC_NL 19.44% 20.40% 21.82% 22.46% 20.47% 23.29% 24.64% 20.27% 21.07% 20.21%
SPLITC_TT 20.32% 25.71% 28.07% 30.07% 26.28% 32.26% 41.73% 29.86% 29.71% 27.30%
Notes: This table reports the mean values for IPO firms per year. The total sample consist of 683 US IPOs completed from 2003 to 2012. Panel A illustrates the
mean of balance sheet items in the assets and liabilities sections. For each subsection, the mean values of total section, total generic line items and total specific line
items are indicated. The value in parenthesis indicates the maximum number of balance sheet items per section according to the ‘Template balance sheet’ in Appendix
1. Panel B presents the mean of the indicator variables (SPLI, SPLIFC and SPLITC). All variables are defined in Appendix 3.
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Table 4
Summary statistics and indicator variables of pre- and post-crisis IPOs
IPOs 2002-2007 (N=437) IPOs 2008-2012 (N=246) Test of differences
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 25th Median 75th Mean
Std.
Dev. 25th Median 75th
Differences
in mean t-statistic
Panel A: Summary statistics
CA_TT (18) 5.70 1.67 5.00 6.00 7.00 5.60 1.63 4.25 6.00 7.00 0.1 (-0.751)
NA_TT (17) 4.75 2.56 3.00 4.00 6.00 4.64 1.95 3.00 5.00 5.75 0.11 (-0.658)
TA_TT (35) 10.45 3.49 8.00 10.00 12.00 10.24 2.98 8.00 10.00 12.00 0.21 (-0.653)
CL_TT (10) 5.42 1.96 4.00 5.00 6.00 5.12 1.63 4.00 5.00 6.00 0.3 (-2.185)
NL_TT (10) 3.14 1.59 2.00 3.00 4.00 3.17 1.43 2.00 3.00 4.00 -0.03 (-0.228)
TL_TT (20) 8.56 2.96 7.00 9.00 10.00 8.28 2.49 7.00 8.00 10.00 0.28 (-1.307)
Panel B: Indicator Variables
SPLI
SPLI_CA (8) 1.20 0.93 0.00 1.00 2.00 1.28 0.93 1.00 1.00 2.00 -0.08 (-1.184)
SPLI_NA (8) 1.38 0.97 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.39 0.84 1.00 1.00 2.00 -0.01 (-0.268)
SPLI_CL (2) 1.31 0.50 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.39 0.51 1.00 1.00 2.00 -0.08 (-1.974)**
SPLI_NL (5) 0.97 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.60 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 (-2.599)***
SPLI_TT (23) 4.86 1.96 3.00 5.00 6.00 4.91 1.82 4.00 5.00 6.00 -0.05 (-0.205)
SPLIFC
SPLIFC_CA 26.77% 21.21% 0.00% 25.00% 40.00% 30.92% 23.13% 20.00% 25.00% 50.00% -4.15% (-2.321)**
SPLIFC_NA 43.41% 26.05% 33.33% 50.00% 66.67% 45.90% 24.73% 33.33% 50.00% 66.67% -2.49% ( -1.24)
SPLIFC_CL 93.59% 18.98% 100% 100% 100% 94.51% 16.91% 100% 100% 100% -0.92% (-0.652)
SPLIFC_NL 46.72% 32.19% 33.33% 50.00% 66.67% 42.38% 32.08% 0.00% 50.00% 50.00% 4.34% (-1.696)*
SPLIFC_TT 43.94% 14.97% 33.33% 44.44% 54.55% 45.71% 15.05% 36.36% 45.45% 55.56% -1.77% (-1.494)
SPLITC
SPLITC_CA 14.96% 11.62% 0.00% 12.50% 25.00% 16.06% 11.63% 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% -1.10% (-1.184)
SPLITC_NA 17.19% 12.10% 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% 17.43% 10.56% 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% -0.24% (-0.268)
SPLITC_CL 65.56% 24.85% 50.00% 50.00% 100% 69.51% 25.26% 50.00% 50.00% 100% -3.95% (-1.974)**
SPLITC_NL 19.45% 13.67% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 16.83% 12.04% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 2.62% (-2.599)***
SPLITC_TT 21.11% 8.54% 13.04% 21.74% 26.09% 21.35% 7.90% 17.39% 21.74% 26.09% -0.24% (-0.367)
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Table 4, continued from previous page
Panel C: Plot of SPLI variable mean for pre- and post-crisis IPOs
Notes: This table reports separate summary statistics for pre-crisis IPOs (2003 and 2007) and post-crisis IPOs (2008-2012). The total sample consist of 683 US IPOs
completed from 2003 to2012. Panel A presents the summary statistics of balance sheet items in the assets and liabilities sections. The value in parenthesis indicates
the maximum number of balance sheet items per section according to the ‘Template balance sheet’ in Appendix 1. Panel B illustrates the mean of the indicator
variables (SPLI, SPLIFC and SPLITC). Panel C plots SPLI variable mean for pre- and post-crisis IPOs (in parenthesis the maximum number of categories). All
variables are defined in Appendix 3. The table reports in parentheses the t-statistics for tests of differences in the means across the two subsamples. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5
Summary statistic and indicator variables of fast and slow IPOs
Fast IPOs 2002-2007 (N=350) IPOs 2008-2012 (N=333) Test of differences
Variable Mean Std.Dev. 25th Median 75th Mean
Std.
Dev. 25th Median 75th
Differences
in mean t-statistic
Panel A: Summary statistics
CA_TT (18) 5.54 1.72 4 6 7 5.8 1.59 5 6 7 -0.26 (-2.070)**
NA_TT (17) 4.63 2.56 3 4 6 4.8 2.12 3 4 6 -0.17 (-0.981)
TA_TT (35) 10.16 3.55 8 10 12 10.6 3.04 9 10 12 -0.44 (-1.732)*
CL_TT (10) 5.26 1.91 4 5 6 5.37 1.79 4 5 6 -0.11 (-0.731)
NL_TT (10) 3.06 1.56 2 3 4 3.24 1.51 2 3 4 -0.18 (-1.511)
TL_TT (20) 8.33 2.96 6 8 10 8.61 2.63 7 8 10 -0.28 (-1.313)
Panel B: Indicator Variables
SPLI
SPLI_CA (8) 1.18 0.96 0 1 2 1.28 0.9 1 1 2 -0.1 (-1.480)
SPLI_NA (8) 1.36 0.97 1 1 2 1.41 0.87 1 1 2 -0.05 (-0.726)
SPLI_CL (2) 1.3 0.49 1 1 2 1.38 0.5 1 1 2 -0.08 (-2.126)**
SPLI_NL (5) 0.89 0.64 0 1 1 0.96 0.67 1 1 1 -0.07 (-1.497)
SPLI_TT (23) 4.73 2.03 3 5 6 5.04 1.77 4 5 6 -0.31 (-2.154)**
SPLIFC
SPLIFC_CA 27.12% 22.41% -4.15% -4.15% 40.00% 29.43% 21.52% 20.00% 25.00% 50.00% -2.31% (-1.351)
SPLIFC_NA 43.28% 26.25% -2.49% -2.49% 66.67% 45.35% 24.89% 33.33% 50.00% 66.67% -2.07% (-1.041)
SPLIFC_CL 93.97% 18.73% -0.92% -0.92% 100% 93.84% 17.77% 100% 100% 100% 0.13% (-0.112)
SPLIFC_NL 43.87% 32.41% 4.34% 4.34% 50.00% 46.67% 31.95% 33.33% 50.00% 50.00% -2.80% (-1.201)
SPLIFC_TT 43.68% 15.77% -1.77% -1.77% 54.55% 45.52% 13.56% 36.36% 45.45% 54.55% -1.84% (-1.712)*
SPLITC
SPLITC_CA 14.73% 11.99% -1.10% -1.10% 25.00% 16.03% 11.22% 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% -1.30% (-1.480)
SPLITC_NA 16.95% 12.16% -0.24% -0.24% 25.00% 17.61% 10.90% 12.50% 12.50% 25.00% -0.66% (-0.726)
SPLITC_CL 65.09% 24.75% -3.95% -3.95% 100% 69.07% 25.23% 50.00% 50.00% 100% -3.98% (-2.126)**
SPLITC_NL 17.82% 12.88% 2.62% 2.62% 20.00% 19.28% 13.42% 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% -1.46% (-1.497)
SPLITC_TT 20.55% 8.82% -0.24% -0.24% 26.09% 21.90% 7.69% 17.39% 21.74% 26.09% -1.35% (-2.154)**
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Table 5, continued from previous page
Panel C: Plot of assets and liabilities sections mean for fast and slow IPOs
Notes: This table reports separate summary statistics for fast IPOs (2003 and 2007) and slow IPOs (2008-2012). The total sample consist of 683 US IPOs completed
from 2003 to 2012. Panel A presents the summary statistics of balance sheet items in the assets and liabilities sections. The value in parenthesis indicates the
maximum number of balance sheet items per section according to the ‘Template balance sheet’ in Appendix 1. Panel B illustrates the mean of the indicator variables
(SPLI, SPLIFC and SPLITC). Panel C plots the mean of balance sheet items in the assets and liabilities sections for fast and slow IPOs. All variables are defined in
Appendix 3. The table reports in parentheses the t-statistics for tests of differences in the means across the two subsamples. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6
Summary statistics and indicator variables of IPOs per industry
Business
Equipment
Consumer
Durables
Consumer
Nondurables
Healthcare,
Medical
Equipment
and Drugs
Manufacturing Oil, Gas
and Coal
extraction
and
products
Other Telephone
and
Television
Transmission
Utilities Wholesale,
Retail and
Some
services
Variable
Panel A: Summary statistics (Mean)
CA_TT (18) 5.63 6.45 5.72 4.91 6.36 6.17 5.98 5.88 5.39 5.83
NA_TT (17) 4.16 5.91 5.00 3.96 5.24 5.93 5.38 5.60 4.67 5.06
TA_TT (35) 9.78 12.36 10.72 8.87 11.61 12.11 11.35 11.44 10.06 10.89
CL_TT (10) 5.42 5.45 5.00 5.03 5.24 5.70 5.60 5.68 4.50 5.17
NL_TT (10) 2.85 3.82 3.22 2.70 3.53 3.83 3.41 3.38 3.50 3.36
TL_TT (20) 8.27 9.27 8.22 7.73 8.77 9.52 9.01 9.04 8.00 8.53
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Table 6, continued from previous page
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of IPOs per industry (Fama-French 10 industry). The total sample consist of 683 US IPOs completed from 2003 to2012.
Panel A presents the mean of balance sheet items in the assets and liabilities sections. The value in parenthesis indicates the maximum number of balance sheet
items per section according to the ‘Template balance sheet’ in Appendix 1. Panel B illustrates the mean of the indicator variables (SPLI, SPLIFC and SPLITC). All
variables are defined in Appendix 3.
Business
Equipment
Consumer
Durables
Consumer
Nondurables
Healthcare,
Medical
Equipment
and Drugs
Manufacturing Oil, Gas and
Coal
extraction and
products
Other Telephone
and
Television
Transmission
Utilities Wholesale,
Retail and
Some services
Panel B: Indicator Variables, continued from previous page
SPLI
SPLI_CA (8) 1.10 1.27 1.00 0.93 1.52 1.74 1.50 1.38 1.44 1.25
SPLI_NA (8) 1.17 1.82 1.44 1.13 1.67 1.72 1.78 1.76 0.89 1.48
SPLI_CL (2) 1.31 1.36 1.17 1.22 1.42 1.72 1.44 1.46 1.28 1.25
SPLI_NL (5) 0.78 1.09 1.00 0.90 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.06 1.11
SPLI_TT (23) 4.36 5.55 4.61 4.18 5.62 6.15 5.71 5.56 4.67 5.09
SPLIFC
SPLIFC_CA 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.32 0.42 0.34 0.32 0.37 0.27
SPLIFC_NA 0.40 0.50 0.44 0.39 0.52 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.24 0.46
SPLIFC_CL 0.95 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.75 0.91
SPLIFC_NL 0.38 0.53 0.52 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.55
SPLIFC_TT 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.41 0.46
SPLITC
SPLITC_CA 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.16
SPLITC_NA 0.15 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.19
SPLITC_CL 0.66 0.68 0.58 0.61 0.71 0.86 0.72 0.73 0.64 0.63
SPLITC_NL 0.16 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.22
SPLITC_TT 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.22
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Table 7
Balance sheet variables and first-day returns
Variables Dependent variable: First-day returns
Model 1 Model 2
TA_TT -0.004
(-0.002)*
CA_TT 0.006
(-0.005)
NA_TT -0.009
(-0.003)***
TL_TT 0.002
(-0.003)
CL_TT 0.002
(-0.004)
NL_TT 0.000
(0.005)
Control variables Included Included
ASSETS Yes Yes
DAYS Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
Industry cluster Yes Yes
No. of observations 668 668
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.12
Notes: This table presents regression models of assets and liabilities variables on IPO first-day returns. Model 1
presents the effects of Total Assets and Total Liabilities, while in model 2 the assets and liabilities data are
disaggregated into current and noncurrent. All variables are defined in Appendix 3. The coefficients on the control
variables are not tabulated. The robust standard error is reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 8
The effects of generic and specific variables on IPO first-day returns
Variables Dependent variable: First-day returns
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
GENERIC -0.001
(0.004)
SPECIFIC -0.001
(0.001)
CA_GEN 0.008 0.012
(0.007) (0.007)
CA_SPE 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
NA_GEN -0.013 -0.016
(0.008) (0.009)*
NA_SPE -0.006 -0.008
(0.003)** (0.003)**
CL_GEN -0.001 -0.002
(0.012) (0.012)
CL_SPE 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.004)
NL_GEN -0.003 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009)
NL_SPE 0.001 0.004
(0.005) (0.006)
Control variables Included Included Included Included Included Included
ASSETS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
DAYS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 668 668 668 668 668 668
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12
Notes: This table presents regression models of generic and specific variables on IPO first-day returns. All variables
are defined in Appendix 3. The coefficients on the control variables are not tabulated. The robust standard error is
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9
Indicator variables and first-day returns
Variables Dependent variable: First-day returns
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
SPLI_TT 0.000 -0.034
(0.004) (0.123)
SPLIFC_TT 0.004 0.035
(0.050) (0.118)
SPLITC_TT -0.005 0.725
(0.092) (2.814)
Control variables Included Included Included Included
ASSETS Yes Yes Yes Yes
DAYS Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 668 668 668 668
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Notes: This table presents the regression models of indicator variables (i.e. SPLI, SPLIFC and SPLITC) on first-day
returns. All variables are defined in Appendix 3. The coefficients on the control variables are not tabulated. The robust
standard error is reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 10
Disaggregated indicator variables and first-day returns
Variables Dependent variable: First-day returns
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
SPLI_CA -0.003
(0.008)
SPLI_NA -0.007
(0.008)
SPLI_CL -0.010
(0.015)
SPLI_NL 0.021
(0.011)*
SPLIFC_CA -0.032
(0.035)
SPLIFC_NA 0.016
(0.029)
SPLIFC_CL -0.022
(0.040)
SPLIFC_NL 0.039
(0.027)
SPLITC_CA -0.022
(0.067)
SPLITC_NA -0.053
(0.063)
SPLITC_CL -0.020
(0.030)
SPLITC_NL 0.107
(0.056)*
Control variables Included Included Included
ASSETS Yes Yes Yes
DAYS Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 668 668 668
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.11 0.11
Notes: This table presents regression models of the disaggregated indicator variables on first-day returns. The indicator
variables are those calculated for each assets and liabilities subsection. All variables are defined in Appendix 3. The
coefficients on the control variables are not tabulated. The robust standard error is reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
